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ABSTRACT 
The populations of Germany and Italy are largely pacifist, but while many 
Germans are also anti-military, many Italians are not. Attitudes towards war and military 
forces were shaped in both states by their experiences during World Wars I and II and by 
the roles their respective militaries played in these conflicts. In the 21st century, other 
factors continue to shape the role that war and military forces play. International pressure 
to be global powers intersects with domestic political reluctance, and the transition to an 
all-volunteer professional military has enabled increased competence and availability of 
military forces at the expense of further widening the gulf between civilians 
and service members. In Germany's case, pressure to be a security provider comes from 
other NATO states. However, German domestic politics, constitutional limitations, and 
societal aversion to war have kept Germany from being more active militarily. Italy, on 
the other hand, strives to be a more robust security provider, but is limited by its modest 
economic resources. Additionally, while Italian government officials have fewer 
prohibitions on the deployment of military forces abroad, they must balance their 
actions against a largely pacifist population. Allies who seek military partnership with 
Germany or Italy would do well to work within the confines of the respective German 
and Italian national security cultures. 
v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vi 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS .......................................................1 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION ...........................1 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES .........................................................2 
1. Germany .........................................................................................3
2. Italy..................................................................................................3
D. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................4 
1. Germany .........................................................................................5
2. Italy..................................................................................................7
E. RESEARCH DESIGN ...............................................................................9 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW .............................................................................10 
II. GERMANY: THE ROLE OF WAR AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS
THE MILITARY .................................................................................................13 
A. PRE-WORLD WAR I .............................................................................14 
B. WORLD WAR I .......................................................................................15 
C. THE INTERWAR YEARS .....................................................................17 
D. WORLD WAR II .....................................................................................18 
E. THE COLD WAR ....................................................................................20 
F. POST-COLD WAR .................................................................................24 
G. PERCEPTION OF THE ARMED FORCES IN 
CONTEMPORARY GERMAN SOCIETY ..........................................26 
H. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................32 
III. THE USE OF GERMAN MILITARY FORCES ABROAD:
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THE MOVE
TO A VOLUNTEER FORCE .............................................................................33 
A. DEPLOYMENT OF GERMAN TROOPS ABROAD: THE
ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ..........................................34 
B. DEPLOYMENT OF GERMAN TROOPS ABROAD: THE 
ROLE OF DOMESTIC POLITICS .......................................................38 
C. RESULTS OF THE SHIFT TO AN ALL-VOLUNTEER
FORCE......................................................................................................42 
D. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................45 
IV. ITALY: THE ROLE OF WAR AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE
MILITARY ...........................................................................................................47 
A. PRE-WORLD WAR I .............................................................................48 
viii 
B. WORLD WAR I .......................................................................................49 
C. THE INTERWAR YEARS .....................................................................50 
D. WORLD WAR II .....................................................................................52 
E. THE COLD WAR ....................................................................................54 
F. POST-COLD WAR PERIOD .................................................................55 
G. PERCEPTION OF THE ARMED FORCES IN 
CONTEMPORARY ITALIAN SOCIETY ...........................................58 
H. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................60 
V. THE USE OF ITALIAN MILITARY FORCES ABROAD: 
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THE MOVE 
TO AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE ................................................................61 
A. DEPLOYMENT OF ITALIAN TROOPS ABROAD: THE 
ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ..........................................62 
B. DEPLOYMENT OF ITALIAN TROOPS ABROAD: THE 
ROLE OF DOMESTIC POLITICS .......................................................63 
C. RESULTS OF THE SHIFT TO AN ALL-VOLUNTEER 
FORCE......................................................................................................70 
D. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................72 
VI. CONCLUSION: UNDERSTANDING THE CHARACTER AND
VALUE OF GERMAN AND ITALIAN MILITARY SUPPORT ..................75 
A. GERMANY ..............................................................................................75 
B. ITALY .......................................................................................................79 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................85 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ...................................................................................95 
ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. German defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP .............................35 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 xi 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
CSDP               Common Security and Defense Policy 
EU    European Union 
GDP    Gross Domestic Product 
ISAF    International Security Assistance Force 
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
OEF    OPERATION Enduring Freedom 
RC-West   Regional Command-West (Afghanistan) 
ROE    Rules of Engagement 
UN    United Nations 










LIST OF FOREIGN TERMS 
   Bundestag      German parliament 
   Bundeswehr      German military post-1955 
   Carabinieri      Italian paramilitary police force belonging to the Ministry of 
Defence  
   Deutsche Welle       German government broadcaster  
   Esercito Italiano      Italian Army 
   Guardia di Finanza         Italian paramilitary police force belonging to the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance  
   Il Giornale d’Italia      A prominent Italian newspaper 
   Istituto Affari   [Italian] Institute of International Affairs 
   Internazional 
   Luftwaffe        German air force  
   Marina Militare   Italian Navy 
   Ministero della    [Italian] Ministry of Defence 
   Difesa 
   Nationale      [German Democratic Republic] National People’s Army 
   Volksarmee        
   Putsch   Coup 
   Sturmabteilung    Storm Detachment or “Brown Shirts” 
   Reichswehr        German military during the interwar years  
   Schutzstaffel   Hitler’s elite paramilitary organization 
   Wehrmacht   German army during World War II 
 xiii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
First and foremost, I would like to thank my two outstanding thesis advisors, Dr. 
Donald Abenheim and Dr. Carolyn Halladay. Dr. Abenheim’s solid support of my research 
was truly appreciated, as were his interesting and lively classes that allowed me to increase 
my knowledge of a part of the world that I had not given much thought to before. 
Dr. Halladay’s steady hand throughout the thesis process proved to be a great help. Her 
in-depth analysis of my research and her insights on civil-military relations were essential. 
Her classes were also extremely interesting, relevant, and a joy to be a part of.        
I would also like to thank the faculty and staff of the Department of National 
Security Affairs for creating such an outstanding and highly ranked program.  
Lastly, I would like to thank my spouse, Kaylyn, for her consistent and reliable 
support. She has been my partner through many journeys in life, and I look forward to 
having her by my side for many more.   
 xiv 




Contemporary debate in the United States about European security seizes on the 
purported military reticence of continental European NATO states. This issue raises the 
question of military posture and the employment of armed force in foreign policy. This 
thesis will examine the legacy of the two former Axis powers that are today prominent 
NATO members—Germany and Italy—and the unique ways in which international and 
domestic political pressures combine to prompt them to use their armed forces abroad, as 
well as how society in each state views their service members and the missions they are 
sent to perform. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The study of how Germany and Italy use their military forces presents a conundrum 
to the modern scholar and policy-maker in three ways. First, the populations of Germany 
and Italy have widespread anti-war and anti-military sentiments; where did these skeptical 
attitudes come from, and how do they influence their state’s decisions to participate in 
international military missions, especially in the period since 1990? Second, both states 
continue to provide troops to security and reinforcement missions; how is this policy and 
posture possible given the aforementioned attitudes towards war and military forces? 
Third, and finally, how is this knowledge useful to those allies that may join with Germany 
and Italy in future multinational military missions?  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
It is important that U.S. leaders understand that both Germany and Italy can be 
useful allies in global crises that require a cooperative joint military effort. Germany is the 
fourth-largest economy in the world and forms an integral part of the European Union.1 
Because of its economic power and diplomatic influence, Germany is able to provide and 
sometimes willing to contribute sizable contingents of troops for multinational military 
                                                 
1 Germany is listed as having the fourth highest GDP in the world. “Gross domestic product 2016, 
World Bank, December 15, 2017, https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf. 
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operations. Italy is also of great import to its allies.  With a combination of economic might, 
a willingness to be a security provider, and ideal geography, Italy is situated to act as a 
buffer to the unstable states to its south and east.2  
Additionally, the weight of history links Germany and Italy with the United States: 
both European states were early members of NATO and have been staunch allies of the 
United States for many decades. While there have been significant differences of opinion 
in regards to the post September 2001 Global-War-on-Terrorism, Germany and Italy have 
ultimately made meaningful military contributions to multiple locations around the globe. 
These nations are also bearing the burden of reassurance and forward presence in a 
revitalized Article V NATO in the wake of Crimea.  
This thesis also provides insight into how the role of military forces can evolve. 
After World War II, Germany and Italy designed and rebuilt their armed forces to fight the 
Soviet Union. However, with the disorder that has come to characterize the 21st century, 
both states have been forced to adjust manpower, recruitment, and budgetary policies in 
order to cope with the ever-changing security environment.  
Lastly, in light of the disorder of the 21st century, governments are using military 
force more often and in more places. However, societal attitudes towards the use of military 
force do not shift as rapidly as events in the world. Thus, the governments of Germany and 
Italy have used inventive ways of gaining and maintaining public support.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Both Germany and Italy have unique national cultures that influence when, where, 
and how they employ their armed forces. Additionally, both states also view their military 
personnel in distinctly different ways.  
                                                 
2 Italy has the eighth largest GDP. World Bank.  
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1. Germany  
As a legacy of defeat in the World Wars, Germany has strong pacifist and anti-
military contingents in the parliament and population. However, under intense international 
pressure—experienced initially during the beginnings of the Cold War and now from calls 
to increase its international leadership—Germany has striven to strike a balance between 
supporting international military coalitions while appeasing the “anti” politicians and the 
citizens they represent. 
A few factors help shed light on this hypothesis. For obvious reasons connected 
with its past, “war guilt” helped create the pacifist and anti-military groups. These groups 
became a solid fixture of West German politics between 1945 and 1990, and have 
continued after German reunification. However, despite the pressure exhibited by these 
groups, external events combined to mitigate their efforts. In the early 1950s, as the 
NATO alliance solidified and the Cold War began to threaten, West Germany was 
pressured to rebuild its military as a way to strengthen both NATO and European security.3 
In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, Germany faced pressure to contribute more 
financial and military resources towards international security efforts because of its 
increasing economic and political power. German leadership tries to balance these calls for 
increased involvement with its domestic politics by grudgingly supporting multinational 
military operations, provided they are sanctioned by the United Nations, NATO, or the 
European Union.  
2. Italy  
Successive Italian governments have believed that participation in multinational 
military operations increases Italy’s standing in the global hierarchy of states. However, 
this belief contrasts sharply with the pacifist sentiments of the Italian people. Thus, the 
government attempts to circumvent this opposition by masking the true nature of military 
deployments and by keeping the public generally unaware of the details.  
                                                 
3 Donald Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed 
Forces (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 43. 
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Italian pacifism stems from the miseries caused by World Wars I and II. This 
collective suffering has created a society that is decidedly anti-war—which is a problem 
for Italian governments. Because Italy is not powerful enough to be considered a first-rate 
power, its governments seek to increase its reputation by being an active participant in 
international and multinational military operations. However, Italian governments must 
tread carefully around its requests for military forces: general pacifism could morph into 
focused opposition. Thus, Italian governments use obfuscatory language such as “peace-
keeping” and “humanitarian” to refer to military missions abroad. The public’s lack of 
knowledge about the details of these operations is exacerbated by the media’s lack of 
interest in reporting on them.4 Additionally, Italian pacifism never hardened into anti-
militarism for at least two reasons. First, the Italian military has always been subordinate 
to the state and has never sought to abrogate its powers. Second, the Italian military has 
never been linked to wartime atrocities like the German army. As a result, Italians 
appreciate their military forces while simultaneously opposing their use for anything 
resembling war.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Literature on the subject of civil-military relations has historically focused on the 
interactions in the higher aspects of state and war between senior military officers and their 
political leaders; making rare appearances are anecdotes about how the average solider and 
civilian interacted and what they thought of each other. Also, more recent scholarship has 
begun to examine how mass politics and media can influence a state’s civil-military 
                                                 
4 Piero Ignazi, Giampiero Giacomello, and Fabrizio Coticchia, Italian Military Operations Abroad: 
Just Don’t Call It War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 160–181.  
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relationship. Often, this research has used opinion polls and survey data to extrapolate 
meaning and detect shifts.5  
There are a few gaps in the current compendium of knowledge. First, while the 
subject of civil-military relations in Germany has, unsurprisingly, received considerable 
attention since the end of World War II, the subject for Italy has not; the field is relatively 
recent and scholars have begun to publish their research in English. Second, a synthesis of 
civil-military relations for each state, from the pre-World War I period to the present day, 
is lacking. Lastly, there exists a scarcity of how this knowledge can be useful to those states 
who may partner with Germany and Italy on international military operations.    
1. Germany 
Two secondary sources are used to examine the role of the German military within 
society. Gordon Craig, in The Politics of the Prussian Army, describes the actions of the 
German army from the late 17th century to 1945; however, only material from the early-
1900s to 1945 is used in this thesis. Craig’s method is to focus on the macro-level issues 
of high politics and international relations. He explores how the German military in this 
period sought to avoid civilian control and was often at odds with statesmen and political 
leaders.6 The German military also had a role in guiding foreign policy, an aspect of 
Germany’s civil-military relationship that proved problematic.7 A general theme of Craig’s 
work is the exclusive nature of the military, its separation from civilian society, and the 
repercussions of such a situation.8 In later chapters, Craig discusses the militarism ushered 
                                                 
5 The following articles and book make abundant use of public survey data in order to detect shifts in 
support for military operations and military personnel. Sarah Brockmeier, “Germany and the Intervention 
in Libya,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 55:6 (December 2013), 63–90, doi: 
10.1080/00396338.2013.862937; Gerhard Kummel, “The winds of change: the transition from armed 
forces for peace to new missions for the Bundeswehr and its impact on civil-military relations,” Journal of 
Strategic Studies 26:2 (June 2010): 7–28, doi: 10.1080/01402390412331302955; Fabrizio Coticchia, 
“Effective strategic narratives? Italian public opinion and military operations in Iraq, Libya, and Lebanon,” 
Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, 45, 1 (April 2015), 13, 18, 22. Doi: 
10.1017/ipo.2015.1. 
6 Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army: 1640–1945 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1964), 271–286. 
7 Craig, 255–299.  
8 Craig, 382–427.  
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in by National Socialism and its attendant consequences.9 Needless to say, militarism and 
Nazism spelled disaster for Germany and much of Europe, ergo the need to revamp civil-
military relations in post-war Germany.  
Because Craig’s work ends at 1945, another source is required if one wishes to 
examine the subject further. Donald Abenheim’s book, Reforging the Iron Cross: The 
Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces, leads the reader on a 
comprehensive journey through the state of civil-military relations in West Germany from 
post-World War II to the late 1980s. Abenheim presents an overview of the influence of 
military reforms in the 1920s and how they were often consulted in the attempts to rebuild 
the West German military in the 1950s. The founders and leaders of the West German 
military grappled with the question of how to recreate a force so rich in past tradition, but 
now much despised by the society it was committed to defend.  
Frederick Zilian, in From Confrontation to Cooperation: The Takeover of the 
National People’s (East German) Army by the Bundeswehr, picks up where Abenheim 
leaves off.10 Covering the tumultuous period of the early-1990s, Zilian examines the ways 
in which the soldiers of the East German Army were absorbed into the Bundeswehr in 
October 1990. He also pays equal attention to why this transition occurred with relatively 
little difficulty. Zilian’s main argument is that the absorption of the East German army was 
possible only because the West German army had become thoroughly imbued with the 
ideals of being a parliamentary army made up of “civilians in uniform.”11 This was a great 
achievement considering the caste and totalitarian rule that defined the German military 
and its relationship with civil society prior to 1945.  
Information about Germany’s decision to deploy troops to Afghanistan is explored 
in Martin Nils master’s thesis, “Germany in Afghanistan: The German Domestic Dispute 
                                                 
9 Craig, 427–504.  
10 Frederick Zilian Jr., From Confrontation to Cooperation: The Takeover of the National People's 
(East German) Army by the Bundeswehr (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1999). 
11 Zilian, 141. 
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on Military Deployment Overseas.”12 Nils explains how the decision to deploy troops was 
a controversial one. What started as a symbolic statement of solidarity and support for the 
United States soon morphed into a battle to convince parliamentarians and society that a 
deployment of Bundeswehr troops was in Germany’s best interests. Nils’ thesis is also 
useful in that it explores the politics surrounding Germany’s decision to not support the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Because the stance of the United States was so distasteful to 
Germans and because much political capital had been spent on getting German troops to 
Afghanistan, it was expedient for the government to oppose the Iraq invasion.  
2. Italy 
Three secondary sources were used to analyze the history of Italian military forces 
and their role within society: John Whittam’s Politics of the Italian Army: 1861–1918, Ciro 
Paoletti’s A Military History of Italy, and Roy MacGregor Hastie’s The Day of the Lion: 
The Life and Death of Fascist Italy. Whittam’s main argument is that the military acted 
primarily as a tool for the government in its attempts to solidify the national unification 
that was nominally achieved in 1861.13 One of the main criticisms leveled at Whittam’s 
work is that it draws completely from secondary sources and contains no analysis.14 It also 
fails to address the critical period from 1918 to 1945. Of note is that Whittam’s work is the 
first English-language attempt to summarize Italian military history and civil-military 
relations.15  
Paoletti’s work, A Military History of Italy, helps fill in the gap left by Whittam, in 
that he covers the period from the end of World War I to the early 2000s.16 The greatest 
strength of Paoletti’s work is that it is comprehensive, covering from the late 1300s to 2008. 
                                                 
12 Nils Martin, “Germany in Afghanistan: The German Domestic Dispute on Military Deployment 
Overseas,” (master’s thesis, James Madison University, 2016), 
http://commons.lib.jmu.edu/master201019/118. 
13 John Whittam, Politics of the Italian Army: 1861-1918. (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1977), 132–133, 
140, 153, 150–181, 173. 
14 Charles L. Bertrand, “Politics of the Italian Army: 1861-1918,” Review in The American Historical 
Review83, no. 1 (February 1978): 206, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1866012. 
15 Bertrand, 206. 
16 Ciro Paoletti, A Military History of Italy (Westport: Praeger, 2007). 
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Unfortunately, the book is only a few hundred pages long and thus sacrifices detail for 
breadth. Paoletti focuses primarily on military history and international politics, with 
limited forays into how certain policies or actions affected the general public. Additionally, 
the book follows a narrative style, with little analysis.  
Background on Italy’s fascist period was culled from MacGregor-Hastie’s The Day 
of the Lion: The Life and Death of Fascist Italy, 1922–1945.17 Like Whittam and Paoletti, 
MacGregor presents a narrative history of Italy’s experiences during the interwar years and 
World War II, but goes further in that he offers abundant detail and analysis. Of relevance 
to this thesis, MacGregor examines the various factors that made fascism popular in 
interwar Italy. Political and economic disorder caused by World War I, as well as intense 
pressure from socialist groups hoping to gain a foothold in Italy, helped endear the fascist 
movement to Italian civilians and military members alike.18 The reasons why the military 
was able to be co-opted by the Fascists is treated lightly, but is of sufficient nature to 
understand that Mussolini wished to use it to provide law and order and as an engine with 
which to project his foreign policy goals.19 MacGregor’s analysis of the role the military 
played from 1943 to 1945 is of key importance: it was the military who discerned what 
was happening and decided to ally itself with the Allies at the last minute, thus saving Italy 
from a burdensome post-war settlement.20  
Piero Ignazi, in Italian Military Operations Abroad: Just Don’t Call It War, 
presents contemporary information about the role that Italian international military 
missions play within Italian society. Of interest is that this book is of recent origin and 
limits itself to 1990–2008, thereby making the research more relevant to the present. 
Additionally, the work is in English, indicating that the genre is becoming more 
established. Ignazi’s main argument is that the end of the Cold War enabled Italy to use its 
armed forces in pursuit of foreign policy objectives—something it had not done to a great 
                                                 
17 Roy MacGregor-Hastie, The Day of the Lion: The Life and Death of Fascist Italy, 1922–1945 (New 
York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1963).  
18 MacGregor-Hastie, 108–109, 113, 117, 116–117.  
19 MacGregor-Hastie, 83, 85–86, 102, 108–109, 110, 112, 173–174.  
20 MacGregor-Hastie, 321–322, 342–343, 347–348.  
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degree before—and that the new security environment ensured that the Italian people 
would acquiesce to such a use as long as certain parameters were adhered to.21 This 
acquiescence is gained in three ways: the ignorance of politicians about the true nature of 
the missions their troops are engaged in, a purposefully ambiguous strategic narrative 
designed to keep Italian civilians ignorant as well, and a paucity of media coverage that 
enables said ignorance.22 The book concludes with an attempt to link the current state of 
civil-military relations to future decisions on the use of armed forces abroad, and how Italy 
will attempt to balance domestic and international political pressures with its goal of 
becoming a legitimate player on the world stage.23  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis proceeds as a comparative case study. Germany and Italy were chosen 
for three reasons: both states suffered tremendously during World Wars I and II and were 
either defeated in both conflicts (Germany) or experienced ignominious victories (Italy); 
both states have strong pacifist and/or anti-military contingents within their populations as 
a result of their past experiences; and in the 21st century, both states face intense 
international pressure to participate in multinational military coalitions, with the pressure 
on Germany being externally-induced while that on Italy is induced internally.   
Additionally, this thesis attempts to distill approximately 100 years of history into 
a relevant synopsis; thus, secondary sources that analyze critical past events are used 
extensively, as are a lessor number of primary sources such as demographic and economic 
statistics and published national defense strategies. Because this thesis also examines and 
incorporates aspects of current affairs, international relations, social science, and civil-
military relations, source material drew widely on newspaper and journal articles, public 
opinion surveys, think tank and university studies, and social media content. Source 
materials for Germany were drawn from a mix of German and English language sources; 
                                                 
21 Ignazi, 2. 
22 Ignazi, 160–186.  
23 Ignazi, 160–186.  
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when sources were found in German, an Internet-based translation service was used. 
Source materials for Italy were primarily in Italian, and no translation service was required.   
Of note, I have employed multiple different phrases to refer to military operations 
overseas. Specific examples include: military operations overseas, military operations 
abroad, military missions abroad, deployment of troops abroad, international deployments, 
international military coalitions, international military missions, multinational military 
coalitions, multinational troop deployments, and multinational military operations.    
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis contains five additional chapters: the role of war and attitudes towards 
the German military, the use of German military forces abroad, the role of war and attitudes 
towards the Italian military, the use of Italian military forces abroad, and a conclusion about 
the type of military support Germany and Italy will provide in the future; the final chapter 
also contains commentary about why the information contained in this thesis is of interest 
to those states who may partner with Germany and Italy in future multinational military 
operations.  
Chapter II establishes the historical context of German anti-war and anti-military 
sentiment by examining the effects of World Wars I and II. The chapter then explores the 
background behind the formation of the West German military and how its mission during 
the Cold War often clashed with society’s virulent anti-war and anti-military feelings. The 
chapter continues with a section about the ways the German military met the challenges 
associated with the end of the Cold War, and concludes with a summary of how German 
service members are perceived within society in the 21st century.    
Chapter III examines three key factors that affect the extent to which Germany 
commits its armed forces to multinational military coalitions: the role of international 
politics, the role of domestic politics, and the consequences of the shift to an all-volunteer 
military.  
Chapter IV shifts the focus to Italy and lays the historical foundation for Italian 
anti-war sentiment. Emphasis is placed on Italy’s unique style of being averse to war but 
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approving of its armed forces. Commentary is made about Italy’s desire to define its place 
in the global hierarchy of states during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, and the 
ways it used its military to do so. The chapter concludes with a section about how Italian 
service members are viewed within 21st century Italian society.  
Chapter V examines three key factors that affect the extent to which Italy commits 
its armed forces to multinational military coalitions: the role of international politics, the 
role of domestic politics, and the consequences of the shift to an all-volunteer military.  
Finally, Chapter VI attempts to show why the information in this thesis is important 
to Germany’s and Italy’s allies. Specifically, given the three factors examined in the 
previous chapters (the role of international and domestic politics and the move to an all-
volunteer military model), how likely are Germany and Italy to support multinational 
military operations? The chapter concludes with an analysis about how German and Italian 
forces, when deployed abroad, will be equipped and what national caveats they will operate 
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II. GERMANY: THE ROLE OF WAR AND ATTITUDES 
TOWARDS THE MILITARY 
In 2009, as the German role in NATO ISAF in Afghanistan escalated, a New York 
Times reporter on assignment to Berlin wrote the following about the German soldiers he 
saw in public:  
Often, as I have passed through the main train station here in the German 
capital, I have seen the sad, lone figure of a soldier, heavy pack on his back, 
waiting for a train like the rest of us, but separated from the crowd by the 
uniform he wears. No one would stop to thank him for his service or to ask 
whether he had been deployed to Afghanistan. The loneliness was obvious, 
but at times I even sensed what I thought might have been fear, at the 
occasional hostile looks the soldier would receive alongside the 
impassiveness of the broader masses on the platform, who just tried to 
pretend he wasn’t there.24 
The reporter goes on to describe such other instances of German soldiers facing 
indifference or even outright hostility while in public, such as the staff sergeant who was 
threatened with assault because he was wearing his uniform at a train station.25 The article 
ends with an emphasis on German society’s pacifist sentiments and lack of empathy for 
the hardships endured by its deployed soldiers.26 
This chapter describes the origins and evolution of the German aversion to war and 
military forces. Specifically, it explores the effects of World Wars I and II on the German 
population by examining the role the German military played in both of these conflicts. 
The chapter concludes with a section about contemporary perceptions of the German armed 
forces, and draws conclusions showing that the German military is still battling very strong 
anti-war and anti-military feelings among the population it serves.    
                                                 





A. PRE-WORLD WAR I 
If one of the powers of a state is to possess and act on its own policy objectives, 
then the German army can be seen as a state-within-a-state during the run-up to World War 
I. The military vigorously resisted attempts to be controlled by parliament, widened the 
gap between civilian society and itself through its exclusionary policies in the granting of 
commissions, and had an unhealthy influence on foreign policy.  
The very structure of the Wilhelmine German state ensured that the military was 
not under parliamentary control. In fact, one of the supreme paradoxes was that the War 
Minister was a military officer who owed loyalty to the King, while at the same time was 
a minister beholden to the constitution.27 However, the person filling this position normally 
catered to the military and its wishes and disregarded parliament, thus helping to perpetuate 
the stark divide between civilians and the military.28 The military was also an active force 
in drafting legislation. In one case, it lent its assistance to a bill intended to protect itself 
from encroachment by parliamentary efforts to limit its size and budget.29  
Liberal and Socialist members of Parliament became increasingly angry about the 
influence of the military in political affairs, and began to view officer recruitment practices 
as the source of their frustration. The German military had historically filled its officer 
ranks with landed aristocrats. It was a common belief among senior military officers at the 
time that the granting of commissions to sons of the middle-class would infect the army 
with progressive or liberal beliefs.30 However, there were not enough aristocrats to fill all 
the officer positions, so it was finally conceded that officers could be commissioned from 
the middle class.31 Nevertheless, the inclusion of officers from other social classes did not 
                                                 
27 Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army: 1640–1945 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1964), 223; T.N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807–1945 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 125.  
28 William Geffen, “The Role of the Military in West German Defense Policy Making,” (PhD diss., 
University of Denver, 1971, 77–78. 
29 Craig, 220.  
30 Craig, 232–234; Geffen, 108.  
31 Antulio J. Echevarria II, After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers Before the Great War 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 67.  
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have the effect of liberalizing the military; the new officers assumed the airs of the old 
aristocrats and became thoroughly entrenched in the political conservatism and feudal 
philosophy then prevalent in the military.32  
The army was also involved in the conduct of foreign affairs. Specifically, the 
influence of Alfred von Schlieffen in the years until 1905 is especially illuminating. As 
chief of staff of the army, his influence upon the then-Minister of Foreign Affairs led to 
the Moroccan crisis of the year 1906.33 Additionally, Schlieffen took it upon himself to 
modify strategic-level war plans without coordinating with Germany’s allies or much of 
the German government.34 The fact that a military officer could affect his state’s foreign 
policy to such a degree is a concept foreign to many democratic societies. 
In the years leading up to World War I, the German military ensured that it 
remained outside governmental control: it did not answer to parliament and the bulk of 
German citizens were purposefully excluded from being considered for leadership 
positions. Additionally, the military’s role in foreign policy meant that a small cadre of 
self-interested senior officers was involved in critical decisions that affected the entire 
German polity.  
B. WORLD WAR I  
The imbalance of power in favor of the military further solidified during World 
War I. In fact, the initial order to begin mobilizing the army did not come from the head of 
the German state, or from the chancellor, but from the army chief of staff.35 Once hostilities 
began, civilian leadership gave the army two full years of unhindered control of the war 
                                                 
32 Echevarria II, 68. 
33 The Moroccan crisis was essentially the Kaiser’s public-relations move to repudiate French claims 
upon Morocco, which thus helped to cement the relationship between France and Great Britain during the 
coming war. Craig, 285.  
34 Craig, 287. 
35 Craig, 293. 
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effort.36 Only when it seemed that a victory was not going to be easy or quick did the 
government begin to question whether a negotiated truce was in order.37  
At the time the government was discussing their options, Generals Hindenburg and 
Ludendorff assumed key leadership positions in the army. These men were opposed to 
negotiations and did much to prevent them from occurring.38 They were able to “…create 
and destroy chancellors at will…” and ensured that servants of the emperor with views that 
did not align to their own were dismissed.39  
The German people suffered tremendously for the loss of a war encouraged and 
perpetuated by their military leaders. Nearly two million German service members lost 
their lives in the war, thus creating a demographic disaster.40 Countless others had become 
disabled. Tens of thousands of orphans and widows were left behind.41 The cost in 
economic terms is estimated to be as high as $720 billion.42 The political repercussions 
included the fall of the government and abdication of the Kaiser in the fall of 1918. German 
territorial losses included all of its overseas colonies and 13 percent of its land in Europe.43 
The experiences of the German people during the war helped lay yet another foundational 
layer of future negative attitudes and aversions towards war, military force, and military 
members.  
                                                 
36 Craig, 299. 
37 Craig, 299. 
38 Craig, 299; Dupuy, 163. 
39 Craig, 300; Geffen, 112; Dupuy, 163–165.  
40 An entire generation of young men had been lost. Robert Weldon Whalen, “War Losses—
Germany,” 1914–1918 Online: International Encyclopedia of the First World War, October 8, 2014, 
https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/war_losses_germany. 
41 Whalen. 
42 The economic cost of World War I for Germany is estimated to be $40 billion in 1918 dollars. 
Adjusted to reflect the value of the dollar in 2018, the amount increases to nearly $720 billion. “The impact 
of the First World War on Germany,” School History.org.UK, accessed February 23, 2018, 
http://schoolshistory.org.uk/topics/european-history/weimar-germany/impact-first-world-war-germany/; 
“Inflation Calculator,” Savings.org, accessed February 23, 2018, https://www.saving.org/inflation/. 
43 “Background: The Aftermath of World War I,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 
accessed February 23, 2018, https://www.ushmm.org/learn/holocaust-encyclopedia/background-aftermath-
world-war-i. 
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C. THE INTERWAR YEARS  
Germany’s military leaders had essentially been the primary drivers of strategy and 
foreign policy during the previous war, and as such, much of the blame for the loss could 
be laid at their feet.44 However, it was the emperor that lost his crown, and in his place, a 
republican parliament instituted.45 The officer class immediately engaged in resistance to 
the powers of the new parliament.46 However, despite the chaos and insubordination of the 
military in the immediate post-war period, it survived unreformed, a sign that the German 
people were more fearful of the enemy without than the enemy within, as an incalcitrant 
military at home was preferable to the threat of spreading Russian communism.47  
Despite the survival of the professional soldier into the first epoch of the new 
Republic, its ethos had been badly damaged during the war and afterward. Its ability to 
swear allegiance to the emperor was gone, and with it, a loss of the dynastic focus of 
service.48 Additionally, the conservative factions in government now saw the military as 
useless, whereas the leftist factions viewed it with suspicion.49 The task of rebuilding the 
military and repairing the breech with the government fell to General Hans von Seeckt, a 
guards and general staff officer with wartime service in the East and a very profound sense 
of politics at odds with the Republic.  
Seeckt sought to make the army responsible for the well-being of the state in its 
ideal form—free of partisan politics—not necessarily of who was currently governing it at 
the time.50 Seeckt’s legacy to the Reichswehr and to the Wehrmacht was a military that 
                                                 
44 Craig, 342. 
45 Craig, 342. 
46 One example was Major Bischoff, the commander of the Iron Division, who refused an order to 
return to Germany. Another example was the Kapp putsch, a coup attempt by the military to take over the 
government. During the coup attempt, then-army chief of staff General Seeckt set a policy of “wait and 
see;” he was not going to take a side until he saw which one was going to prevail. Craig, 374, 378; Dupuy, 
183–184.  
47 Craig, 343. 
48 Geffen, 144; Dupuy 183–184; Donald Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for 
Tradition in the West German Armed Forces (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 27–28. 
49 Abenheim, 27–28.  
50 Craig, 387–388. Geffen, 117–118, 133–135.  
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“regarded themselves as the protectors of the Reich and the best-qualified interpreters of 
its essential interests.”51 In the coming decade, the “best-qualified interpreter” was deemed 
to be Hitler.  
D. WORLD WAR II  
Up to this period, the German military had been autonomous from and influential 
of the government. Hitler saw this autonomy as a challenge to his aspirations for 
ultimate power, and from 1933 to 1938, took crucial steps to bring the military under his 
sole control.  
Hitler’s first key step towards his consolidation of power occurred in March, 1933, 
during a speech at the Garrison Church at Potsdam, in which he addressed a gathering of 
military officers and Nazi potentates. Through a combination of effusive appeals to 
cooperation and empathy towards their inter-war plight, Hitler convinced many attendees 
that he was working in their best interests.52   
Hitler followed up on this initial success by taking steps to sever the military from 
any civilian control or democratic influences. He eliminated the requirement for soldiers 
to be subject to civilian judicial processes and abolished enlisted “union” representatives, 
both key steps towards ensuring that the military would not question its orders or be subject 
to any sort of civilian control.53   
Through foreign policy maneuvers, Hitler signaled to the military that he was, 
again, acting with their interests in mind. In October 1933, he withdrew Germany from an 
arms control conference, a sign taken by the military that it would soon be allowed to 
pursue vigorous rearmament.54  
                                                 
51 Craig, 428. 
52 After the speech, one senior officer remarked, “We German officers used to be called representatives 
of reaction, whereas we were really bearers of tradition. It is in this sense that Hitler spoke to us, so 
wonderfully and directly from the heart.” Craig, 470. 
53 Craig, 471. 
54 Craig, 471; Dupuy, 232. 
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Hitler’s attempts to sway the military to his side bore further fruit at the end of June 
1934. As his cronies went about the country murdering political opponents, the military 
exhibited complicity through its inaction—officers ignored the massacre because it 
furthered their interests. The Sturmabteilung had been gaining in power and was beginning 
to be seen as a challenger to the traditional military. Its elimination was seen as a desired 
step towards reasserting the military’s hierarchy within the state.55  
A few months later, a pact was made between Hitler and the military: troops swore 
unconditional obedience to him, and he, in turn, swore to ensure the military’s “stability 
and inviolability.”56 Four years later, in February 1938, Hitler finally assumed supreme 
control of the armed forces. After forcing his chief military opponent to resign, Hitler 
decreed, “Henceforth I will personally exercise immediate command over the whole 
armed forces.”57  
Germany now began to increase its officer ranks at a pace unprecedented in recent 
history. From 1933 to 1936, the number of German officers increased by nearly 600 
percent.58 Senior officers had usually taken great care to cultivate and educate younger 
officers in customary soldierly traditions.59 However, this was now not possible. Not only 
were there too many accessions to the officer ranks in such a short amount of time, but 
many young men had spent their youth in Nazi indoctrination camps.60 Additionally, now 
that politics and the military had become thoroughly enmeshed, there arose a climate of 
cronyism and opportunism.61 The military, once a prevailing force in politics, had now 
become subordinated to Hitler.  
                                                 
55 Craig, 477–478; Dupuy, 234–235.   
56 Of note was that the swearing of allegiance to a person had ceased to exist after World War I. Craig, 
479–480.  
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58 Craig, 482–483.  
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Indeed, as the war dragged on, the military was increasingly used as a force for 
Hitler’s social policies. Of course, the Schutzstaffel had been directly involved in and 
responsible for war atrocities from the beginning, but the Wehrmacht was not exempt 
either. During its fighting in the East, the Wehrmacht routinely engaged in acts that could 
be considered as atrocities, such as the indiscriminate and widespread killing of civilians.62 
Bound to Hitler by its oath of allegiance, the German military continued to fight, despite 
the probability of victory being nonexistent. This refusal to surrender thus ensured that 
German citizens suffered greatly: they were bombed, suffered deprivation of every kind, 
and their land was invaded and occupied at the war’s end. 
E. THE COLD WAR 
In the aftermath of World War II, the German military was no longer capable of 
being the political actor it once was. It had lost millions of soldiers on multiple fronts, its 
equipment was destroyed, and its morale and reputation were in tatters. Upon defeat, the 
Allies ensured that German military personnel were subjected to a re-education campaign 
that emphasized “that soldierly virtues and military tradition had been in reality 
camouflaged immorality.”63  
German civilians, surrounded by heaps of rubble and piles of dead, saw the military 
as one of the chief culprits. The military, long a staunch ally of the state, had been an 
accomplice in the disaster and for this could not be forgiven.64 In this atmosphere, many 
virulent strains of nascent “anti” were finally unleashed: anti-militarism, anti-military, and 
anti-war. These strong attitudes would grow to great influence in the subsequent decades. 
The traditional role of the German military, one that had endured for so long, was never to 
be repaired in any fashion reminiscent of the past.  
Yet it was a scant five years later, in 1950, that the West German government began 
planning with NATO allies for the creation of a Federal German military force. By 1948, 
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in the wake of the Berlin crisis, American and British leaders already had been secretly 
prodding the West Germans to start rebuilding their military.65 Secrecy was required 
because of the intense anti-military sentiment of German civilians. This sentiment was so 
strong that many Germans, if faced with the choice to fight or die, would have rather 
perished.66 In 1950, with the Korean War in the headlines, further legitimacy was given to 
the effort when Great Britain formally asked West Germany to contribute a contingent of 
troops to a then-nascent European Defence Force concept. However, even this step met 
with great disapproval.67 Over the next several years, those parliamentarians and ex-
soldiers asked to rebuild the military had to grapple with a concept that had failed in the 
state prior to 1914 and 1933: democratic civilian control of the military.  
One of the main pillars for the new West Germany military was the concept of 
soldiers being not subjects or racial warriors, but simply civilians-in-uniform. In the past, 
German parliaments had been separate from the military apparatus; the legislative could 
poorly dictate how the military ran its organization or how it treated its soldiers. Now, the 
desire of both politicians and senior military leaders was to have a military that was 
thoroughly integrated into democratic society.68 One of the early members of the 
Bundestag security committee stated in 1950, “Germany had in the past a good army. 
Today we doubtless have the start and development of a good democracy. But we in 
Germany have never had at the same time a good army, a good democracy, and a balanced 
relationship between the two.”69 During the formative years of the Bundeswehr—as the 
new West German military came to be called—the Bundestag took two concrete steps to 
ensure that soldiers remained citizens.  
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The first was to ensure that the people, as represented by parliament, controlled the 
military. Thus, it was decided that the Defence Minister would be the peacetime 
commander-in-chief of the military, but that he or she would report directly to the 
Bundestag.70 This arrangement was a fundamental departure from past practice with a 
separate war ministry and general staff, wherein the military had historically resisted any 
attempts to be accountable to parliament. This change would have a profound effect on 
future decisions to commit troops to military operations abroad. Additionally, the decision 
was made to replace the traditional oath with a “ceremonial obligation to the armed 
forces.”71   
The second way the Bundestag ensured that the soldier remained a citizen was 
through its close supervision of many aspects of a soldier’s life. Two examples were the 
elimination of elaborate and non-functional cult of the uniform for one that resembled a 
civilian suit, and the encouragement of soldiers to wear civilian clothing as much as 
possible.72 But the changes were not only skin-deep. The Bundestag wanted to ensure that 
the Bundeswehr was firmly under the control of civilian masters, thus many aspects 
normally left to military chiefs and their bureaucracies were enshrined into law: rules for 
conscientious objectors, restrictions on who could serve in the military, a guarantee of basic 
civil rights for soldiers, the prohibition of any form of military justice system, the 
placement of civilians into military administration posts, and stipulations on what extent 
soldiers could participate in politics.73 The Bundestag took unto itself three other 
prerogatives: the formation of a chief of staff (called a Generalinspekteur), a parliamentary 
commissioner capability for the Bundestag, a supervisory role in the propagation of ethical 
training, and the right to commission officers.74  
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However, despite these innovations, the civil-military relationship in the young 
West Germany remained strained amid the legacy of defeat and the turmoil of the cold war. 
In the 1960s, a confluence of three factors contributed to this tension. First, a new 
generation of critical historians—often themselves veterans of the Wehrmacht—had 
started to produce scholarship that implied Wehrmacht complicity in Nazi wartime 
atrocities.75  Second, the younger generation did not accept the difference between Nazi 
and military leaders; to them, this group of men had been one and the same, both guilty of 
war crimes.76 Further complicating the issue was that the founders of the West German 
political, economic, and military institutions were ending their careers and thus unable to 
stem the incoming tide of protest.77 In conjunction with these factors, youth protests arose 
all across West Germany, and it was the military that became the focal point of objection.78 
Young men refusing draft orders rose dramatically, as did cases of insubordination towards 
junior officers and non-commissioned officers.79  
Thus, as the military came to be the target of so many attacks, it became and was 
increasingly viewed by its enemies as reactionary. In fact, some critics believed that the 
military was being prepared to act as an internal police force against political dissidents.80 
Into this political cauldron of protest came Social Democrat Helmut Schmidt, who saw the 
need for reform in the military and ordered a revision of the decree on military ethics.81 
The revision proved to be well-timed; it reinforced the concept of a civilian-in-uniform, 
but also made it clear that lawful orders from seniors to juniors were to be followed, since 
the Bundeswehr was “an army within a democracy, as opposed to being a democratic 
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army.”82 The reforms returned order to the Bundeswehr and helped to quell German 
concerns about the military.  
After a lull in the 1970s, new critics of society and the military emerged, and their 
attacks followed a familiar pattern.83 The Bundeswehr was accused of harboring and 
nurturing Wehrmacht traditions, and military pageantry and ceremonies became 
increasingly viewed as vestiges of an undemocratic past.84 The government decided that 
yet another revision of the ethics regulation was required. Some of the more noteworthy 
changes included: a re-emphasis on the democratic underpinnings of the Bundeswehr and 
how its mission was rooted within the Basic Law, that the military existed solely to defend 
peace (and not propagate war), a complete break with Wehrmacht traditions, and 
restrictions on the location and frequency of the ceremonial oath taking.85  
F. POST-COLD WAR 
Soon, another major international event would bring Germany and the Bundeswehr 
into its orbit—the end of the Cold War. With Germany’s reunification in late 1990, the 
united German government and the Bundeswehr wrangled with how to integrate the 
thousands of soldiers of the Nationale Volksarmee (NVA—East Germany’s military) who 
had been indoctrinated with the ideals of the army of the socialist type, that is, the core 
principles of command of the Soviet military adapted to the East German state.  
The main challenge with integrating the soldiers of the NVA into the Bundeswehr 
was that its members had been thoroughly indoctrinated with military and political doctrine 
foreign to Bundeswehr soldiers. The welfare of the soldier had been placed beneath the 
overriding imperative to maintain a high state of combat readiness, NVA soldiers 
unquestioningly obeyed any order from their superiors, and they believed that preventative 
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or pre-emptive war was justified against “imperialist aggression” (by NATO or the 
West).86 The West German concept of the civilian-in-uniform had to be taught to the 
former-NVA soldiers who were absorbed into the Bundeswehr. This process took the form 
of sending troops to abbreviated courses, on-the-job training, and through the example of 
Bundeswehr personnel.87  
What was remarkable about the Bundeswehr’s mission to absorb the NVA was the 
lack of onerous political oversight. With but a few exceptions, the Bundestag and Ministry 
of Defence allowed the military full license to pursue the mission:88  
This evidence [the lack of political oversight] supports the proposition that 
the Bundeswehr has truly matured as a military force grounded in liberal, 
democratic principles. It indicates that in the span of about two generations 
since the end of World War II, the ideals of liberal democracy have indeed 
taken root and have been internalized by German military leaders. The ideal 
of the citizen in uniform was assumed and acted on, not forced on them and 
monitored by political leaders.89 
The subordination of the military to civilian authority was indeed a great accomplishment, 
one that preceding generations of German politicians had been striving to attain for 
decades.  
With the end of the Cold War, international pressure increased on Germany to 
assume a greater leadership role in the world. Critics argued that Germany was rich and 
united, but had stood on the sidelines while other states had pursued the objective of 
international peace.90 The chancellor and his government stated that Germany would “lose 
its international credibility” unless it was allowed to deploy troops in conjunction with UN 
missions.91 Under this pressure, the Bundestag passed a constitutional amendment that 
would permit the Bundeswehr to deploy troops outside NATO territory if approved by the 
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UN or other international organization.92 Accordingly, the mission statement of the 
Bundeswehr was modified to include a provision for employment in accordance with 
Chapter VIII of the UN charter.93 Three years later, in July 1994, the constitutionality of 
deploying Bundeswehr troops in support of UN missions was upheld. However, troops 
could only be deployed if the Bundestag approved by a simple majority vote.94  
While the scope of the Bundeswehr’s mission had increased, as had the 
government’s constitutional ability to employ it in more places, segments of the German 
population—who were in a euphoric thrall about the end of the Cold War—began to 
question the necessity of maintaining a military. The Bundeswehr was thus again put on 
the defensive, both politically and socially. It found itself receiving less money and fewer 
troops, and in the social realm, more odium. In 1994, a court announcement ruled that 
bumper stickers that said “Soldiers are Murderers” was an acceptable form of speech. Thus, 
the familiar tug-of-war between society, the military, and the government, juxtaposed 
against international calls for increased German leadership, would continue to clash as 
Germany entered the 21st century.   
G. PERCEPTION OF THE ARMED FORCES IN CONTEMPORARY 
GERMAN SOCIETY 
Contemporary German society is now decidedly anti-war and anti-military for 
reasons of the culture of memory, the lessons of the past, and out of a self-serving desire 
to shirk the burden of arms that is normal for neighbor democracies such as Switzerland or 
France. Much of the German media with its leftist and pacifist bent helps to reinforce these 
attitudes by its comprehensive (and often negative) reporting of issues of service and 
conflict surrounding the military. The government does try to shape the public discourse, 
but its attempts are not successful, as the Bundeswehr is still viewed negatively within 
society.   
                                                 
92 Zilian, 182. 
93 Chapter VIII grants latitude to regional arrangements (such as the EU or NATO) to engage in 
conflict resolution. Zilian, 178.  
94 Zilian, 182.  
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The prevalence of German media coverage of the Bundeswehr is one factor that 
greatly influences the public’s perception of its military forces.95 From September 2017 to 
January 2018, the German government broadcaster Deutsche Welle published more than 
sixteen articles dealing with the Bundeswehr, the Ministry of Defence, or subjects relating 
thereunto.96 Because the public gains a large part of its knowledge about current events 
from the media, and because that knowledge is shaped to a significant degree by the tone 
of the coverage, German media outlets can greatly influence what the public thinks about 
their military forces and their use. Moreover, the media-to-public flow of information is 
not a one-way street: German media outlets respond to demand as well. Thus, an abundance 
of reporting about the Bundeswehr also indicates a demand for such content.  
While all Western militaries must necessarily weather criticism at times, military 
scandals in Germany can take on outsized proportions. The most recent scandal, that of the 
mythical and compelling figure of 1st Lieutenant Franco Albrecht in the spring of 2016, 
involved a plot by this German Bundeswehr officer and his compatriots to assassinate 
government politicians while masquerading themselves as refugees from the Syrian war.97 
The aftermath involved a lot of soul-searching by the German media and by Ministry of 
Defence officials of aspects of service in the dimensions of command and morale that had 
not received the emphasis they had rightly deserved in the past decade, neglected in favor 
of the efforts expended on the NATO ISAF mission and other extra European security roles 
in Africa. The media began to run stories about whether the Bundeswehr naturally attracts 
                                                 
95 German citizens perceive the Bundeswehr mostly though the media. Television is the most prevalent 
(70% of 2,500 respondents reported seeing some coverage in the last 12 months), followed by newspapers 
(64%), then the radio (36%), followed last by the Internet (23%). Additionally, 85% of respondents did not 
know the Bundeswehr had changed its motto to: “We. Serve. Germany.” Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut 
der Bundeswehr [Social Science Institute of the Bundeswehr]. Wahrnehmung und Bewertung des Claims 
“Wir. Dienen. Deutschland.“, Image der Bundeswehr sowie Haltungen zum Umgang mit Veteranen 
Ergebnisse der Bevölkerungsumfrage [Perception and evaluation of the claim “We. Serve. Germany.”: 
Image of the Bundeswehr as well as attitudes to dealing with veterans], (Strausberg: 
Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, 2012), 11, 16. 
http://www.mgfa.de/html/einsatzunterstuetzung/downloads/kurzberichtsowibevo776lkerungsumfrage20121
.pdf?PHPSESSID=c1adfeb93dba293d043f1fc95f6b2278.  
96 The cumulative tone of the articles was a typical mix of some being supportive of, many being 
critical of, and a fair amount being neutral towards the Bundeswehr and Ministry of Defence.  
97 Deutsche Welle, “Report: Top German officials on terror suspects hit list,” May 9, 2017, 
http://p.dw.com/p/2cez1. 
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those with extreme right-wing views.98 One story referenced a poll that stated that two-
thirds of Germans think “…the German army lacks sufficient leadership and control…” 
and over one-third believes that right-wing extremism is more prevalent in the military than 
in society. Actions taken by the Ministry of Defence involved removing a photo of Helmut 
Schmidt from the walls of the university that bears his name, and a revision of the military 
ethics order.99 Additionally, unit memorabilia rooms came under attack for having 
Wehrmacht-era artifacts, even though the ethics order of 1982 allows for such things.100  
To its credit, the government attempts to shape the public discourse towards 
favorable views of the Bundeswehr. The 2016 White Paper states that, “the people in this 
country [Germany] recognise the importance of our citizens in uniform. They rely on them, 
they are grateful, and they feel connected to them. Their interest in them is sincere. This is 
expressed in a multitude of respectful gestures and words.”101 
An official survey taken by the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences in 2012 
corroborates the White Paper statement above: 86 percent of respondents believed the 
Bundeswehr is important for Germany, 90 percent believed that wounded veterans deserve 
better medical care, and 75 percent supported increased special care for the families of 
veterans.102 The same survey, conducted in 2013, backs up the data from 2012: 77 percent 
of respondents had a positive attitude about the Bundeswehr, 65 percent felt gratitude for 
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it, and 55 percent believed that Bundeswehr members do not receive enough public 
appreciation or support.103 However, positive statements and data in official documents 
and surveys do not always reflect the true situation. For all the lofty rhetoric official sources 
use to say the Bundeswehr is supported, there are many examples from the past several 
years that indicate it is not.  
In 2005, there was great public outcry when the Bundeswehr held a Grand Tattoo 
to celebrate its 50th anniversary. The entire ceremony area was blocked off, attendance 
was by invitation only, and 1,200 people protested the event. Then-Minister of Defence 
Peter Struck had to defend the ceremony, stating that it had nothing to do with the 
Wehrmacht, but with old Prussian traditions.104  
A 2007 survey found that more than 73 percent of Bundeswehr soldiers would not 
recommend military service to a friend.105 Sentiment was high that the Bundeswehr was 
not adequately equipped or funded.106 A similar survey administered to military officer 
students in 2014 found that a majority believed German society did not support the military 
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or their desire to join it.107 Over half of respondents said that wearing their uniform in 
public made them feel “uncomfortable” or “displaced.”108   
In the 2016 White Paper, there is a picture of a Bundeswehr recruiting office that 
has been vandalized with pink paint.109 A sign outside the office reads, “We are also 
fighting for you [for you to have the right] to be against us.”110 A caption to the photo 
reads, “Controversy is colorful…the Bundeswehr is ready and willing to debate.”111 
Apparently, the Bundeswehr had opened American-style recruiting offices in an effort to 
bolster its recruitment, and certain segments of the population were unhappy with such a 
move.112  
Lastly, in a recent survey about public trust, conducted by the German public 
broadcaster Deutsche Welle, soldiers were nowhere mentioned. In descending order from 
having the most public trust were police officers, universities, doctors, and the respondent’s 
                                                 
107 Fogarty presents the following information in her article “Backing the Bundeswehr,” 745–750: -
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-79% (274 out of 345) said that the Bundeswehr is not well known or slightly well known in German 
society. 
-85% (293 out of 345) said that they (as a soldier) were not valued or slightly valued by German 
society.  
-88% (306 out of 347) said that they were not supported or slightly supported by German society for 
their decision to join the Bundeswehr.  
-50% (273 of 548) said that, while wearing their uniform in public, they feel “uncomfortable,” 
“displaced,” or just do not do it.  
-90% (310 of 343) said that the German media is hostile or ambivalent to the Bundeswehr.  
-66% (229 of 347) have had to defend their decision to join the Bundeswehr. 
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own employer.113 These responses are in stark juxtaposition to similar surveys conducted 
in the United States, where military members routinely rank among the highest in public 
trust.114 While it is understandable—given Germany’s past experience with its armed 
forces—that trust in the military would not be as high there as in the United States, this 
example proves to be illuminating nonetheless.  
The theme of tepid public support carries over to how Bundeswehr causalities are 
commemorated. The official monument dedicated to German servicemen and women 
killed in the line-of-duty since 1955 is a square structure that, once a person is inside, 
projects the names of the fallen on a wall for five seconds.115 The reasoning behind this 
practice is explained as follows: “The…names are…only briefly displayed, unlike the 
names engraved on traditional war memorials. This is to consciously distance the memorial 
from hero worship and the glorification of war…”116 In stark contrast to this official 
treatment of their dead, the Bundeswehr meticulously catalogued and transported back to 
Germany all the various memorials erected in Afghanistan.117 These memorials were then 
reassembled into a monument more comprehensive and placed within the grounds of the 
Bundeswehr Operations Command.118 Of note is that the name of each fallen service-
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member is memorialized in a way that is more permanent than a five-second projection 
onto a wall.119  
H. CONCLUSION 
Despite the German government’s attempts to portray the Bundeswehr in a positive 
light, a military that supposedly enjoys wide public support would not have its events 
protested, its soldiers treated with indifference and hostility in the streets, or its offices 
vandalized. In other words, the Bundeswehr is not a wholly trusted component of German 
society. From where does this lack of trust come from? German military involvement in 
politics throughout the early- to mid-20th century helped lay the foundation. Additional 
contributory factors are the role the military played in the devastation caused by World 
Wars I and II and the atrocities committed by the Wehrmacht under Hitler’s direction. The 
finished product is a society that has a strong aversion to military force and to those that 
effect it.  
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III. THE USE OF GERMAN MILITARY FORCES ABROAD:
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC POLITICS AND 
THE MOVE TO A VOLUNTEER FORCE 
Regarding the deployment of military forces, there exists a three-way tug-of-war 
among what Germany’s allies expect, what Germany’s government ministers want, and 
what Germans, as a body politic, are willing to provide. Germany’s allies want the Federal 
Republic to increase its leadership role in the world because of its economic and diplomatic 
power, and part of this call to increased leadership involves using military forces to assist 
in crisis hotspots around the globe. Germany’s government leaders want to assist their 
allies and be seen a cooperative team player, and are willing to use the military if that is 
what is required. Germany’s lawmakers and citizens, however, are much more reluctant to 
approve of using the German armed forces abroad, although German politicians do 
understand the value of being an active participant in NATO and in contributing troops to 
multinational coalitions.120 Additionally, the professionalization of Germany’s military has 
lent a new dimension to the controversial role of military forces within German society. 
The lack of conscription has created a larger gap between the average citizen and soldier, 
with the result being that the public is unable to relate to its military or understand the 
missions it is engaged in.  
120 Donald Abenheim, Carolyn Halladay, “Stability in Flux: Policy, Strategy, and Institutions in 
Germany,” in The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, edited by Thomas C. Bruneau, 
Cristiana Matei, (New York: Routledge, 2013), 306, 
https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780203105276.ch25. 
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A. DEPLOYMENT OF GERMAN TROOPS ABROAD: THE ROLE OF 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
As of January 2018, Germany had 3,710 troops deployed to overseas locations.121 
The motivations behind maintaining such a relatively high number originate from both 
without and within Germany, as it strives to strike a balance between international 
obligations, expectations of allies, and a desire by the political elite for Germany to be seen 
as a reliable partner.  
The campaign and subsequent election of Donald Trump has spurred Germany to 
reconsider their national security status. In May of 2017, Mr. Trump stated that “twenty-
three of the 28 member nations are still not paying what they should be paying….[and] this 
is not fair to the people and taxpayers of the United States.”122 These types of statements 
by a U.S. president are not ignored by German politicians. When Mr. Trump increased the 
number of American troops in Afghanistan in mid-2017, Germany’s Minister of Defence, 
Ursula von der Leyen, said that Germany should do the same.123 Additionally, the 2016 
White Paper on German Security Policy affirmed that the German government “…will and 
is determined to…” increase spending on defense to 2 percent of GDP as well as continue 
to make “substantial” contributions to NATO missions.124 German defense expenditures 
have been decreasing for decades: from 1990 to 2016, defense spending as percentage of 
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GDP decreased from 3.46 percent to 1.18 percent.125 Defense spending has been 
consistently below 2 percent since 2002.126 Before the end of the Cold War, the Federal 
Republic’s defense expenditures were justified based on its role in providing a deterrent to 
Soviet aggression; a stopgap to prevent the masses of Russian and Eastern European troops 
from invading the West.127 After the collapse of the German Democratic Republic, the 
maintenance of a robust deterrent capability was no longer viewed as necessary by the 
German population, and the post-Cold War practice of sending troops abroad to participate 
in multinational military coalitions is not seen as a legitimate enough reason to increase the 
military budget to anything resembling pre-1990 levels.128 
Figure 1.  German defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP 
 
Figure created using data from the World Bank and Trading Economics.com. World Bank, 
“Data: Germany,” accessed April 5, 2018, https://data.worldbank.org/country/Germany; 
Trading Economics, “Germany Military Expenditure: 1990–2016,” accessed April 5, 2018, 
https://tradingeconomics.com/germany/military-expenditure. 
 
Additional sources of international pressure have come from Brexit, mass 
migration flows into Europe, and the crisis in Ukraine. Brexit has effectively eliminated 
one of the three traditional power brokers in Europe, leaving Germany and France to 
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assume the mantel of EU leadership. Mass migration flows have helped German authorities 
to realize that pacifist isolation is not possible in such a global, interconnected world. 
Additionally, the Ukraine crisis reminded Germany that close-to-home military aggression 
is still a possibility. In response to Russia’s invasion of the Crimea, Germany contributed 
1,200 troops to Lithuania to act as a deterrent to further expansion.129 Von der Leyen 
recently admitted that “[Germany’s]…eyes have been opened, and…Europeans must take 
more responsibility for their security.”130 The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, made a 
similar comment implying the same sentiment, “The times in which we can fully count on 
others are somewhat over…we Europeans must really take our destiny into our own 
hands.”131 In short, Germany cannot afford to ignore what goes on outside its borders.  
The second source of pressure on Germany to deploy troops abroad derives from a 
desire by Germany’s political elite to be considered a reliable partner by its allies. Most 
recently, von der Leyen stated as much during a visit to German troops in Jordan: “It’s 
important to me that Germany give assurances that we are reliable.”132 The White Paper 
aligns itself with this statement, in that it recognizes that Germany must take into account 
the interests of its allies and that these must be “closely interwoven” with Germany’s 
interests.133 Because Germany values its relationship with its allies, it “therefore recognizes 
its duty and responsibility to contribute to collective defence on the basis of solidarity.”134 
However, Germany’s aspirations to be seen as “reliable” may be frustrated by what 
the media calls “its ramshackle military.”135 Spiegel reported in 2014 that efforts by the 
129 the local.de. 
130 Nicole Koenig and Marine Walter-Franke, France and Germany: Spearheading a European 
Security and Defence Union? (Berlin: Jacques Delors Institut, 2017), 
http://www.institutdelors.eu/media/franceandgermanyspearheadingaeuropeansecurityanddefenceunion-
koenigwalter-jdib-july2017.pdf?pdf=ok. 
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132 “Germany’s defense minister visits troops in Jordan,” Deutsche Welle, January 18, 2018, 
http://p.dw.com/p/2qnac. 
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Bundeswehr to relocate weapons systems from one base to another were not possible 
because it did not possess enough transport aircraft.136 In the same article, a shipment of 
weapons and military trainers was delayed because of aircraft malfunctions, thereby 
causing political embarrassment to Germany.137 The Bundeswehr’s inability to accomplish 
such simple tasks begs the question about whether its deployed troops are adequately 
equipped, or whether it will have the capability to fly them home once the deployment is 
over. It can be awkward for a global economic superpower, such as Germany, to be 
hampered by a military that more closely resembles that fielded by a minor state.  
This internally produced pressure to be a more global participant is also reflected 
in the White Paper. The paper concedes that Germany is an integral part of the world—
economically and politically—and that the strength of the German state can only continue 
if external threats are perceived and mitigated.138 The paper imparts a strong impression of 
globalism. The authors realize that only by looking outside its borders can Germany 
continue to prosper and that security policy is key: “Germany’s security policy horizon is 
global.”139  
Notwithstanding such lofty statements, Germany’s resolve to increase the use of its 
military as a foreign policy tool is subject to a few caveats. The White Paper states that 
“[Germany’s]…increased role in international security policy will not…lead to automatic 
outcomes or obligations that run counter to…[its]…values and interests or 
overstretch…[its]…capabilities.”140 In short, Germany will not commit its troops to 
overseas military deployments without extensive consultation (both with its allies and 
within the Bundestag), and will not overstretch its resources. Therefore, in its desire to 
meet global expectations and increase its role as a security provider, German leaders have 
had to balance the expectations of its allies with the desires of the German people.  
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B. DEPLOYMENT OF GERMAN TROOPS ABROAD: THE ROLE OF 
DOMESTIC POLITICS 
This section focuses on the codified powers of the German Bundestag and 
government and the interplay between the two as regards decisions to send military forces 
abroad. Additionally, the role of the Bundestag’s politicians is examined, as well as the 
influence of the German people as expressed through their political representatives.  
Germany is a parliamentary democracy, and as such, the German chancellor cannot 
unilaterally make a decision to deploy military forces abroad. Such decisions must be 
approved by the Bundestag. This prohibition was upheld in a 2008 ruling by the German 
Federal Constitutional Court, which stated, “Without parliamentary approval, a 
deployment of armed forces is…not permissible under the Basic Law.”141 The ruling goes 
on to state that “the provisions of the Basic Law that relate to the [armed] forces are 
designed not to leave the Bundeswehr as a potential source of power to the executive alone, 
but to integrate it as a ‘parliamentary army’ into the constitutional system of a democratic 
state under the rule of law.”142 The Bundestag thus has the power to approve troop 
deployments, extend them, and terminate them.143 In an emergency, the government can 
deploy forces without parliament’s approval, but it must gain it as soon as possible.144 Of 
note is that the influence of the military on these types of decisions is low.145  
The power of the Bundestag limits the ability of Germany to respond quickly to 
international crises. For example, the decision of NATO to intervene in Libya in 2011 was 
taken so swiftly, with so many evolutions of the courses of action available, that Germany 
141 “Judgment of the Second Senate of 7 May 2008 on the basis of the oral hearing of 12 February 
2008—2 BE 1/03,” The Federal Constitutional Court, accessed January 17, 2018, 14, 
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/2008/05/es20080507_2bve000103e
n.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1.
142 The Basic Law is Germany’s version of a constitution. The Federal Constitutional Court. 
143 Julian Junk and Christopher Daase, “Germany,” in Strategic Cultures in Europe: Security and 
Defence Policies across the Continent, ed. Heiko Biehl, Bastian Giegerich, and Alexandra Jones 
(Wiesbaden: Spring Fachmedien, 2013), 143. 
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was simply unable to keep up.146 In the early 2000s, a collaborative effort by then-Chief of 
Staff General Wolfgang Schneiderhan and then-Minister of Defense Peter Struck, aimed 
at repealing the requirement for the Bundestag to approve military missions prior to their 
departure, but the effort went nowhere.147 The 2016 White Paper has also echoed these 
calls for reducing the authority of the Bundestag, using words such as “immediate” and 
“resolute” in regards to decisions authorizing the Bundeswehr to deploy quickly.148 The 
White Paper suggests that there should be a “possible reform of the constitutional 
framework for Bundeswehr missions abroad.149  
Notwithstanding the recalcitrance of the Bundestag, it usually does approve 
requests to deploy troops abroad. However, it does so while having to balance the desires 
of a fickle constituency.150 In another poll from 2014, this time conducted by the Körber 
Foundation and administered to German civilians, showed that Germans wanted their state 
to assume a greater role in providing international leadership, but not if this entailed the 
use of military force, as 82 percent rejected the use of force as a way of showing 
leadership.151 Thus, German politicians must consider trade-offs between meeting the 
demands of the voters and remaining in power, and meeting the expectations of allies.152 
The most powerful German political parties offer a mixed bag of stances towards 
military deployments and defense spending. The center-left Green party opposes any 
increase in defense expenditures and wants all Bundeswehr deployments to be 
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accompanied by a UN mandate.153 The centrist Free Democrats (FDU) want to focus on 
the creation of a European military, have the Bundeswehr participate in more NATO and 
EU exercises, and relax the constraints on the Bundestag authorization required for 
overseas deployments.154 The center-right Christian Democrats (CDU) and Christian 
Social Unionists (CSU) want to increase defense spending until the goal of 2 percent of 
GDP is reached.155  
The influence of the Bundestag on military organization and funding is great, and 
problematic. For example, from 2000 to 2014, there were four separate initiatives to cut or 
reorganize the Bundeswehr.156 These decisions have drastic repercussions. Units 
downsized or eliminated mean thousands of troops and support personnel become 
unemployed and thrust into the civilian job market, thus creating life-altering situations for 
themselves and their families and morale problems for those who are allowed to remain. 
Additionally, the communities that previously supported the closed installations can be 
truly devastated by closures. Often, the growth of a community located near a military base 
is the result of providing services the base cannot or does not provide, such as excess 
housing, commercial services, and entertainment venues. As a result, there exists a 
symbiotic relationship between a military installation and the community around it, and 
when that installation is closed, the local economy suffers. The effect is only compounded 
when multiple closures occur in short sequence. Moreover, in the interval between massive 
military cuts and when the government decides that those cuts should be reversed, a tragic 
loss of effectiveness occurs. Building military capability is not fast or easy, and losses 
cannot be regained without the expenditure of time and money 
                                                 
153 Nina Werkhäuser, “German coalition hopefuls discuss defense, security,” Deutsche Welle, 
November 2, 2017, http://p.dw.com/p/2msCW. 
154 Werkhäuser. 
155 Werkhäuser.  
156 In 2000, the army suffered a 19 percent reduction in forces. In 2002, the Navy lost all its aircraft 
and the Luftwaffe [German airforce] lost two squadrons. In 2004, 49,000 troops were cut and 105 
installations were closed. In 2010, the Navy lost four submarines and ten ships, the army lost two divisions, 
civilian personnel were cut from 76,000 to 55,000, and 31 bases were closed. Herspring, 116–132.  
 41 
The 2016 White Paper addresses funding and staffing problems. It states that, “at 
present, the Bundeswehr does not yet have sufficient structures and resources.”157 
Additionally, it further states that “a reversal in personnel trends is needed in order to 
establish, expand and further develop required capabilities across the full spectrum of 
defence activities. As a first step, there will be no further reduction in the number of 
military posts.”158 Having an adequately funded military—not one destabilized by frequent 
and arbitrary cuts—is necessary if Germany is to assume a greater leadership role on the 
world stage. 
Bundestag politicians, while cognizant of the necessity of participating in 
multinational military coalitions, must also balance the demands of their constituencies, 
which are often much less understanding.159 Therefore, government leaders must be careful 
about how they frame their requests for troop deployments to the Bundestag. If the public 
believes that a deployment is being requested for “humanitarian” purposes, then there is a 
higher probability of finding support in the Bundestag; such was the case with the 
Afghanistan deployment, which was portrayed as a “peacekeeping,” “nation-building,” and 
“stability” operation.160 Germany deployed the third largest contingent to the coalition, and 
public approval of the mission remained high; in 2005 it stood at 65 percent.161 However, 
a tragic air strike in 2009 caused the public to question their state’s involvement. The air 
strike, called in by German troops and approved by a German commander, unintentionally 
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killed scores of Afghan civilians.162 It was at this point that Germans saw through the 
rhetoric of the government and realized that their troops were involved in a war. At this 
point, public support for the effort in Afghanistan plummeted to just 37 percent and has 
remained low ever since.163  
So it seems that the German people are reasonably comfortable with the 
Bundeswehr being deployed for humanitarian-style missions, but for little else. Germans 
prefer that conflict be first dealt with through economic or diplomatic measures, with 
military force being a truly last resort.164 Even when directly faced with threats, Germans 
still equivocate about using military force. For example, after the terrorist attacks in Berlin 
in 2016, a YouGov poll found that 53 percent of Germans favored ramping up their 
country’s participation in the fight against the Islamic State terrorist group, but nearly 50 
percent were opposed to this increased participation being in the form of Bundeswehr 
military action.165  
C. RESULTS OF THE SHIFT TO AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE 
 Up until 2011, when it transitioned to a volunteer-only service model, Germany 
maintained a military that was composed of 70 percent professionals and 30 percent 
conscripts.166 The system had worked well enough to retain up to that point, but had begun 
to prove rigid and problematic. Because conscripts were not eligible to be sent on 
international deployments, the Bundeswehr did not have its full force to draw on when 
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required.167 In an era of humanitarian and peace-keeping-branded missions that require a 
deployment outside Germany, having one-third of the force unavailable was not ideal. 
Additionally, because conscription was for only a period of six months, training personnel 
beyond the level of basic soldiering was not possible; modern armies have many complex 
machines that require a year or more of training to become proficient at operating.168  
Since transitioning to a volunteer military, Germany has faced two prominent 
challenges. The first is competition from the civilian labor market. The 2016 White Paper 
acknowledges this challenge openly. The Bundeswehr considers itself “a competitive, 
flexible and modern employer” that is “competing for the smartest and most talented 
people.”169 Its goal is to become “one of the most attractive employers in Germany.”170 To 
this end, the Bundeswehr is making changes to increase its appeal to potential employees. 
It is modernizing its barracks (referred to as “accommodations”), creating flexible working 
conditions that would facilitate a better work and life balance, improving pay and pensions, 
and creating onsite childcare for soldiers who are also parents.171 Nonetheless, service in 
the Bundeswehr is still viewed as more of a way-of-life, rather than a way to enrich 
oneself.172   
The second challenge facing the Bundeswehr is how to recruit the young people it 
needs to staff entry-level positions without incurring the ire of opposition groups. Before 
the move to an all-volunteer force, conscription provided the people necessary for entry-
level positions, but now these positions must be recruited for. Thus, the Bundeswehr has 
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become more creative in its attempts to tap into the younger demographic: it has ventured 
into the social media realm and has adopted more aggressive public recruitment efforts.173 
However, these efforts have faced opposition.174 
There have been a few negative effects from ending conscription. Some critics 
contend that the Bundeswehr’s famed concept of “citizens in uniform” is not realistic since 
the force is not drawn anymore from the whole of society.175 Other critics say that an all-
volunteer model attracts those with extreme right-wing views. A former historian from the 
Bundeswehr University in Munich stated that, “any armed force without general 
compulsory military service is no longer a reflection of society, but is rather a 
disproportionate kind of extremist force,” alleging that the Bundeswehr is now more 
susceptible to militarization and violence.176  
A last criticism of the ending of conscription is that it allowed the public to distance 
itself further from national security issues. Before 2011, when conscription was still in 
effect, there existed a constant reminder about the need for state military forces. Now, with 
the professionalization of the force, service members are being drawn from a smaller 
segment of the population, thus pushing “soldiers and their work [into] the periphery” of 
the public consciousness.177 When military service is no longer required of the public, the 
fear of being involved in a military confrontation lessons; as this fear lessens, so does the 
attention paid to events that could prompt the use of military force. Thus, successive 
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German governments may find it easier to persuade the public of the need for foreign 
deployments simply because the public is no longer as invested in national security issues 
as it was before.178 
D. CONCLUSION 
Multiple external and internal sources of pressure have combined to prompt 
Germany to increase its role as a security provider. These sources include criticism from 
across the Atlantic, disorder in Europe and the Middle East, a desire by Germany’s political 
elite to be seen as reliable, and by Bundestag politicians striving to balance Germany’s 
international role with the demands of its voters. German government officials, constrained 
by strict parliamentary controls on the use of military forces, often face an uphill battle 
when requesting to deploy the Bundeswehr; framing the proposed deployment in 
appropriate terms is integral to gaining the support of the population and thus that of the 
Bundestag. Lastly, the scrapping of conscription has created a gap between the military 
and the civil society it serves. As this gap widens, the German population will begin to 
negate even further the ability to project military force as being a prerequisite for regional 
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IV. ITALY: THE ROLE OF WAR AND ATTITUDES 
TOWARDS THE MILITARY 
There is an Italian Army infantry unit called the Bersaglieri. It was created in 1836 
and has served in nearly every battle or war that Italy has engaged in.179 It is also the most 
decorated military unit in Italy and its members are considered as heroes in Italian 
culture.180 Bersaglieri parades through the streets of Italian towns are attended by many 
citizens and are quite a spectacle to behold, as the troopers run—not march—during 
portions of their parade route.181  
The Bersaglieri are not the only Italian military unit with a celebrated past. The 
Alipini, the elite Italian mountain troops, enjoy broad cultural approval as well.182 
However, being “pro-military” (or as “pro-military” as a European state can be) does not 
mean that Italians approve of war. In fact, they are decidedly anti-war. The experiences of 
the Italian people during World Wars I and II have created a collective aversion to war. 
Nonetheless, unlike in Germany’s case, the Italian military has managed to escape the 
odium of the people—Italians do not necessarily link the consequences of war with its 
military personnel—because the Italian military has, throughout the history of the Italian 
state, subordinated itself to civil authority.    
This chapter explains the origins of Italian war aversion by exploring the effects of 
World Wars I and II on the population. The role of the military within civil authority is 
also examined, with an emphasis on the military’s changing role from being one of 
domestic enforcer to an expeditionary extension of state foreign policy. The chapter 
concludes with a section that explores how Italians in the 21st century view their military 
personnel.   
                                                 
179 Gianluigi Arca, “BERSAGLIERI INFANTRY: Heroes in Italian History,” NATO Rapid Deployable 
Corps Italy Magazine, Issue 13, 2009, https://www.nato.int/nrdc-it/magazine/2009/0911/0911i.pdf. 
180 Arca. 
181 “165 Bersaglieri,” YouTube, 0:48, Giuseppe Barracco, November 4, 2010, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tNHOLMRoMK4. 
182 Prospero, “The cultural resonance of Italy’s Alpini,” The Economist, January 11, 2017, 
https://www.economist.com/blogs/prospero/2017/01/mountain-men. 
 48 
A. PRE-WORLD WAR I 
Italy in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was not a homogenous society; it had 
been assembled mere decades earlier from what had previously been a group of disparate 
regions. Not only were different and distinct dialects spoken in each region, but several 
other notable characteristics combined to create disunity. Northern Italy possessed more 
industrial capacity, had a modern market economy, and boasted a more educated and 
urbanized population, whereas southern Italy remained rural and agrarian in nature and was 
poorer than the north.183  
Unsurprisingly, social unrest was prevalent and radical leftist groups sprang up, 
both in the north and south, offering solutions to the inequality created by industrialization. 
The very existence of these groups was problematic for the government—social unrest 
meant that regional identities persisted, and in a state that was striving to become modern, 
it was critical that regional identity be subordinated to Italian homogeneity. Thus, using 
military force to enforce law and order became routine.184 Of note is that both the officer 
and enlisted classes resented being used this way, considering it beneath them to be 
domestic enforcers, but the civil-military balance in Italy was of such a nature that the 
military obeyed the government whether it agreed with its policies or not.185 The early use 
of Italy’s military as auxiliary police forces would set a precedent that would continue into 
the 21st century. However, the stigma that could attach to military forces when used in this 
manner did not endure for the Italian military after this period.  
Two additional facets of the Italy’s civil-military relationship during this period 
deserve to be mentioned. Unlike in pre-war Germany, where the military budget was not 
subject to parliamentary control, in Italy it was, and was frequently the subject of debate.186 
That the funding of the military was even open to discussion in parliament was significant 
because, in pre-war Europe, the armed forces of every European state were usually 
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successful in influencing the budget debate in their favor.187 Italy’s parliament was so 
successful in limiting military influence in budget decisions that the Italian military was 
not considered as being a major player in pre-War Europe.188 
A second notable aspect is the manner in which the Italo-Turkish war of 1911–1912 
was initiated. Unlike in Germany, where military officers routinely meddled in foreign 
affairs, Italy’s invasion of the Turkish province of Libya was the result of the government’s 
attempt to increase nationalism and secure great power status. Indeed, the war was 
encouraged and started by politicians; informing the military about the strategic aims of 
the war was almost an afterthought.189 It was “the civilian leadership…[that] decided upon 
war or peace and the military who, willingly or reluctantly, obeyed their orders.”190  
B. WORLD WAR I  
What began as a great patriotic endeavor soon bogged down in intense, miserable 
combat. The main Italian front was in the mountains in northeast Italy. The mountains are 
a beautiful place to be in peacetime, but present a treacherous and wretched location in 
which to fight a war. Stories about attrition and the senselessness of combat, as told to 
civilians through letters or by soldiers home on leave, contrasted sharply with the view 
presented by the government.191 Miserable conditions for the troops and economic 
consequences in the heartland helped inspire popular opposition to the war. Women in the 
north and south (most of the men were away fighting) began to demonstrate against the 
war. Northerners called the war “endless,” and rural areas were angry about the constant 
requisitions of timber, livestock, and men.192  
To combat this growing unrest and to deal with the mounting costs of the conflict, 
the government nationalized the economy and reoriented it to support the war effort. 
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Thousands of factories were taken over and a new bureaucracy was created to manage 
every facet of manpower, transport, trade, and agriculture.193 The resultant concentration 
of economic might and national willpower combined to expel the Austrian invaders and 
helped contribute to the end of the war for Italy. 
The price of participation in the war was high.  Italy suffered 1,407,000 military 
casualties and thousands of civilians killed, injured, or displaced.194 It also suffered 
national humiliation. Italy had initially sought to remain neutral in the beginning of the 
war, and indeed had considered allying itself with the Austrians in exchange for the 
province of Trentino, but when the Triple Entente promised even more land (Trentino and 
other territories on the eastern shore of the Adriatic), Italy had decided to side with Britain, 
France, and Russia instead.195 However, once the war ended, Italy only gained a portion of 
these lands.196 In its handling of the post-war settlements, the Italian government was 
viewed as weak by nearly every segment of society.197  
C. THE INTERWAR YEARS  
The early 1920s were a chaotic time for Italy. With a population reeling from the 
dire consequences of the economic and human costs of the war, socialists were able to 
exploit popular grievances and fuel a virulent movement to subvert governmental 
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control.198 Discontent with Italy’s post-war settlement was also widespread.199 The prime 
minister proved powerless to combat the growing discontent and subversive elements in 
society, and decided to turn to Mussolini and his Fascists for help in restoring order.200 The 
Fascists were then used to operate the factories and trains when the regular workers were 
on strike, and acted as a quasi-police force for the maintenance of law and order.201  
The King of Italy, Vittorio Emanuel, viewed Mussolini with confidence because of 
his ability to restore order in an increasingly anarchic post-war Italy.202 This belief was at 
odds with the prime minister and his cabinet, who considered Mussolini a revolutionary 
and his Fascists as outlaws. Thus, it was not surprising that in October of 1922, when the 
government was planning on arresting Mussolini and crushing his fascist movement, that 
the King would be susceptible to manipulation and change his mind about supporting the 
government’s course of action.203 The King’s change of mind “converted the fascists…into 
indispensable members of his next government.”204 When the prime minister resigned, the 
King decided to appoint Mussolini in his place.205 At this point, the Fascist movement 
began to be linked to a state-sponsored ideology of militarism and strength. The Fascist 
militia was then placed under the control of the armed forces by the taking of the traditional 
oath of service to the King.206  
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Many Italian military leaders viewed Mussolini and his ideology as a vehicle 
through which to regain the glory Italy had lost during World War I, but this general affinity 
did not mean that the military was in control of the government.207 In fact, Mussolini and 
his government officials were prone to making military decisions without even consulting 
its leaders first. In the case of the Spanish Civil War (1936–1938), Italy’s involvement was 
placed entirely in the hands of the foreign minister, Galeazzo Ciano. Ciano wanted to use 
fascist militiamen instead of regular army troops because he believed they would fight 
harder and be better examples of fascism for the Spanish.208 When Ciano discovered that 
the militia was sorely lacking in experience, he was forced to call upon the military, which 
had previously been reluctant to become involved because its senior leaders did not 
consider their forces strong enough.209 Additionally, Italy’s later decision to side with Nazi 
Germany was not influenced by or even discussed with military leaders.210 For years, 
Mussolini had sidelined the military from being involved in strategic-level decision 
making: senior leaders “were permitted little initiative and rarely consulted…and [were] 
allowed to consider only technical or industrial matters, never strategy, never what kind of 
war to prepare for or against what enemy.211 Because of this exclusion, when World War 
II began, Italy “was without the right weapons or even any effective plan of operations.”212  
D. WORLD WAR II  
By 1943, Italy was facing invasion by the Allies, and members of the military were 
beginning to believe that Mussolini’s efforts to continue to fight were not the best course 
of action.213 General Pietro Badoglio, a senior leader in the Italian war effort, believed that 
the best way to remove Italy from the war was to conclude a separate peace with the 
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Allies.214 Badoglio then began to organize like-minded officers to his cause—to include 
civilian leaders in the Fascist party—and approached the King about the forcible removal 
of Mussolini and a negotiated armistice with the Allies.215  
The three sides came to an agreement and Mussolini was removed from office and 
imprisoned. He was then rescued by German troops and transported to Munich, where he 
set up a second government.216 Mussolini continued to attempt to lead Italy via radio 
addresses and through faithful proxies. He appointed a marshal loyal to him to lead the 
armed forces, but the military split into separate camps anyway; portions of the army and 
air force continued to fight, whereas the navy had already surrendered.217 Badoglio had 
failed to give the armed forces any instructions about what to do after the armistice, and 
Italian service members at home and abroad were confused. The German military, which 
had since occupied Italy, took the initiative and told the Italians to either join them or go 
to prison. Most Italian troops chose prison or fled to the Allies.218 As for Mussolini, after 
having returned to Italy in an attempt to set up a fascist republic, he was captured and shot 
by communist partisans and hung by his heels in Piazzale Loreto in Milan.219  
From the signing of the armistice in 1943 to the conclusion of the war in 1945, the 
fighting against Germans in Italy was done by three different groups: the Allies, Italian 
regular military alongside the Allies, and partisan communists.220 However, by no means 
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did the Allies consider the communists as comrades. Their political views were toxic and 
their efforts were barely tolerated.221 At the same time, Italian regular troops were not 
viewed much differently—they were simply a defeated enemy to be subordinated to the 
will of the Allies, albeit a will considered by both to be to mutual advantage. Thought to 
have made the right move in terminating its alliance with Germany prematurely, Italy still 
found itself in the “defeated” category at the end of the war.222 However, the decision to 
side with the Allies would later prove beneficial to Italy.   
E. THE COLD WAR 
Upon the conclusion of World War II, the Allies had placed restrictions on the size 
and composition of the Italian military.223 However, Italy found ways to circumvent the 
military restrictions and was able to avoid the loss of decades of accumulated military 
knowledge and experience.224 When the Cold War started to intensify in 1948, the 
restrictions on Italy were lifted completely, and it was even encouraged by other Western 
governments to expand its military.225 Italy then embarked on an ambitious course of being 
an active participant in multinational military coalitions. 
The extent to which the Italian armed forces were used during the Cold War period 
is evidence that it was viewed with confidence by its political leaders, by the Italian people, 
and by other governments. During the Korean War, Italian Red Cross units were deployed 
in support of UN troops.226 Within a decade, Italian troops had deployed in a peace-keeping 
role to Somalia, the Congo, Yemen, Jordan, Lebanon, and to the Pakistani-Indian border; 
they returned to Lebanon again in the 1970s and 1980s.227 The Italian navy responded to a 
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Libyan intrusion near Malta in 1973, and it sent multiple naval vessels to assist in refugee 
support in Vietnam in 1979.228 In the 1980s, the navy actively patrolled the Gulf of Aqaba, 
the Straight of Tiran, and the Persian Gulf.229  
The use of the military to enforce law and order on the domestic front continued: 
the Italian army was used seven times between 1945 and 1978 to provide auxiliary support 
to police forces.230 However, its use was of a much different character than in the past. 
Before 1945, Italy’s military had owed its loyalty to a king, been used by the government 
to forcibly create a national identity, and had acted as a constabulary force to protect the 
property of the elites and to maintain law and order. After 1945, the situation had changed. 
Italy was no longer a monarchy, but a parliamentary republic. Military deployments now 
had to be approved by parliament. The military no longer swore fealty to the king, but to 
the state.231 And, the country was no longer a conglomeration of disparate provinces who 
were linguistically and ethnically diverse: it had been molded into a more cohesive state, 
one with a common language, customs, and culture; the need for forced unification had 
passed.  
F. POST-COLD WAR PERIOD 
With the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Italy sought to 
redefine its relevancy amid the reshuffling of global hierarchies by continuing its 
contributions to international military missions. From 1991 to 2000, Italy deployed troops 
to Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Albania, the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Mozambique.232 
However, the political discourse had changed. Without the omnipresent threat of 
communist aggression, the Italian government was now required to more fully justify its 
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desires to deploy military forces abroad. Because Italy’s constitution effectively forbids 
war as a tool of foreign policy, and because parliament is the only political body authorized 
to declare war, the government had to sidestep constitutional obstacles and become creative 
in how it framed the need for military deployments.233 
To justify Italy’s participation in the 1991 Gulf War, the government repeatedly 
used the term “international police operation” because referring to the conflict as a “war” 
was not acceptable.234 For the 1992 Somalia deployment, government leaders stressed the 
“humanitarian” nature of the operation in order to gain parliamentary support.235 In 1997, 
Italy led a multinational military coalition to Albania to help restore law and order. Such 
keywords as “humanitarian” and “training” were used to gain parliamentary support.236 
Italy’s participation in the 1999 Balkan crisis required more political wrangling. Parliament 
wanted to rely on diplomacy, but the government feared that a lack of military involvement 
would “undermine the international prestige and visibility of Italy.”237 Thus, military 
operations were undertaken with minimal discussion between the government and 
parliament and amidst delayed communication to the public.238 In fact, the government 
delayed for five days before publicizing its decision to deploy troops to the Balkans. When 
the decision was announced, extensive use was made of ambiguous terms such as 
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people and as a means for the settlement of international disputes. Italy agrees, on conditions of equality 
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ends.” Article 78 states, “Parliament has the authority to declare a state of war and vest the necessary 
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“integrated defence operation” and “long-range defensive actions” to justify Italy’s 
involvement.239   
The military was also used extensively in the 1990s to quell domestic terrorism and 
crime. In 1992, multiple Italian politicians and businesspersons were investigated for 
bribery and corruption.240 The investigation led back to Cosa Nostra mafia strongholds in 
Sicily.241 Soon thereafter, Sicily erupted in unrest and the state deployed 9,000 troops to 
restore order.242 Operation Vespri Siciliani [Sicilian vespers], as it came to be called, lasted 
for six years and involved 150,000 Italian service members.243 The Italian army would be 
used nine more times throughout the 1990s to provide auxiliary police services and direct 
and indirect support to regular police forces.244 
The end of the Cold War also influenced the size of the Italian military, as many 
experts believed that large armies were no longer necessary. The government thus reduced 
the Italian army from four divisions and 13 brigades to a total of 19 brigades.245 
Additionally, society began to spurn military service, which had an effect on 
conscription.246 In the past, draft periods had been for 18 months, but were gradually 
reduced to only ten months.247 The reduced period of conscription created problems for the 
military because it was not possible to adequately train conscripted troops within such a 
shortened timeframe. Efforts then began within the government and military to move to an 
all-volunteer force, a step that ultimately occurred in the early 21st century.248  
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Despite the challenges confronted by the Italian military in the post-Cold War 
period, there remained a few upsides. It was granted wide latitude in how it used its budget 
and in the way it procured its equipment.249 Additionally, the majority of Italians viewed 
the military in a positive light. They saw it as a stabilizing force and as a symbol of national 
sovereignty.250 The public approval and governmental trust enjoyed by the Italian military 
during the 1990s were beneficial, for they laid a solid foundation that would be tested by 
the ever-changing and chaotic security environment of the early 21st century.   
G. PERCEPTION OF THE ARMED FORCES IN CONTEMPORARY 
ITALIAN SOCIETY 
An expert recently summed up the Italian attitude towards the armed forces and 
their employment by stating, “as much as the Italian public can be sensitive to the 
humanitarian and legal justifications for military operations, it has also shown sincere 
support for its uniformed citizens and great understanding of the conditions dictating their 
deployment abroad.”251 As straightforward as this statement may sound, the relationship 
of Italians to their military could be a study unto itself of paradoxes. On one hand, Italian 
citizens have seen their military forces operating in the domestic arena ever since the state 
was conceived, and thus it should not be too much of a surprise that Italians regularly see 
their military members.252 On the other hand, seeing and interacting with are two separate 
things. The professional nature of the Italian military precludes regular interaction between 
civilians and troops, and while citizens may see troops performing limited duties on their 
city’s streets, they are not aware what they are doing during their overseas missions.  
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The Italian military was, as of 2017, engaged in nine overseas missions.253 Yet 
despite the prevalence of international involvement, there is little media coverage of the 
military’s day-to-day efforts.254 Embedded reporters, or reports from the field, are 
scarce.255 When reporting does occur, the focus tends to be primarily on the tragedies that 
inevitably occur during any sort of military operation.256 The background of each casualty 
and the chronological series of events leading to it are covered at length; such treatment 
ignores the macro-level political decisions prompting the military deployment, thereby 
placing its necessity in a debatable status. Such portrayals can taint the public’s perception 
of international military operations and can cause a decrease in public support. 
Additionally, when defense experts are interviewed, the public finds their arguments 
remote and hard to understand.257 Interestingly, in juxtaposition to Italian civilians who 
spurn the relevance of international affairs, Italian officers are “some of the most 
internationalized and modernized public servants.”258  
Lastly, because Roman Catholicism is such an intrinsic part of Italian culture, the 
Church has great power in shaping public opinion. The universal nature of Catholic belief 
prohibits the Church from endorsing the concept that state sovereignty requires sending 
troops to overseas missions. It believes that diplomacy and moral influence are the keys to 
solving international crises. However, the Church realizes that national security is 
important and does not oppose the maintenance of defense forces.259 This attitude is then 
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reflected in the average Italian, who accepts that having a military is necessary, but finds 
it hard to understand why their state’s soldiers are being sent away to other lands to do 
dangerous jobs.260 
H. CONCLUSION 
The Italian military has undergone multiple evolutions since the inception of the 
Italian state in the mid-nineteenth century. What started out as an enforcer of law and order 
and a vehicle through which national unity could be achieved, later morphed into an 
embodiment of Italian patriotism and nationalism during World Wars I and II. After World 
War II, the Italian military became an instrument of foreign policy, being deployed often 
and afar. How did it escape the type of social indifference and hostility shown to the 
Bundeswehr? First, the Italian military was not a collaborator or perpetrator of violence to 
the levels committed by the Wehrmacht, and second, it did not seek to influence 
government decisions or foreign policy to the extent that the German military had done. 
Thus, while the Italian population is decidedly anti-war, which is not surprising considering 
the devastations both World Wars brought to Italy, it is not anti-military; the Italian military 
is a celebrated and appreciated part of the Italian national culture. 
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V. THE USE OF ITALIAN MILITARY FORCES ABROAD: 
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC POLITICS 
AND THE MOVE TO AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE  
Unlike the Germans, Italians did not view the end of World War II as a “zero 
hour.”261 In Italy, the rebuilding of the military was not accompanied by lengthy debates 
about tradition or whether the military was still relevant. Italy had not suffered the level of 
devastation Germany had, nor did its military share complicity to the same extent as had 
Germany’s in the infliction of said devastation. Indeed, as noted in the previous chapter, 
Italy sought to preserve as much military experience and equipment as it could.  
As soon as it was capable of doing so, Italy immediately began to support 
multinational troop deployments. Since 1945, Italy has participated in 132 military 
missions abroad, and it ranks first among EU states in the number of troops it contributes 
to UN missions.262 The international pressure that Italy felt to participate in multinational 
military coalitions in the post-Cold War period has only intensified since the increase of 
global crises post-2001. In fact, one scholar characterized the Italian armed forces as 
“breathless” because they had been asked to do so much with so little.263 While Italy sees 
itself and wants to be seen as a security provider, it must balance that desire with a 
population that is generally supportive of the troops, but critical of overseas troop 
deployments. Thus, the way the government portrays the need for an overseas troop 
deployment is of critical importance. Also, Italy’s conversion to an all-volunteer military 
has helped it align its recruitment and personnel practices with those of other states. While 
such a move has had its challenges, it ultimately helps posture Italy’s military to be better 
suited to address the types of challenges typical in the early 21st century.  
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A. DEPLOYMENT OF ITALIAN TROOPS ABROAD: THE ROLE OF 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
In public opinion surveys taken in 2013 and 2017, more than 80 percent of Italians 
said that Italy has little to no influence over international or European affairs.264 This 
attitude is also shared by Italian leaders and policy-makers, who see their state as a “middle 
power.” This view has prompted multiple successive governments to take actions that 
portray Italy as being a team player and willing to support international alliances.265 Italy 
considers its participation within military coalitions as a way to both increase its influence 
and to maintain its standing in the international hierarchy.266 For example, “the efforts of 
Italian troops…in Afghanistan have been largely appreciated by officials and diplomats in 
allied countries, [and] represent an asset of Italy’s defence and foreign policy.”267 Italy 
seeks strong partnerships with such allies and multinational coalitions as NATO in order 
to ensure its reputation abroad.268  
Italy’s desire to be seen as a security provider is so robust that it can overcome even 
strong commercial and economic domestic interests. During the 2011 Libyan crisis, Italy 
was facing a difficult decision: participate in the multinational coalition (and thus run 
economic risk), or stay on the sidelines. Italy was arguably the most active trading partner 
with Libya pre-2011. It was “the source of nearly 20 percent of Libyan imports and the 
destination of over 40 percent of its exports.”269 Libya also owned small portions of the 
Italian banking, defense, automotive, and football industries, and was Italy’s third largest 
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supplier of oil and natural gas.270 Outside of economic concerns, there was also 
considerable worry about uncontrollable refugee flows if Gaddafi lost control and Libya 
became a failed state.271 There were also historic and cultural connections. Libya had been 
an Italian colony and up until 1969, some 20,000 Italians had lived there.272 Thus, it is no 
wonder that Italian leaders were wary about participating in actions that had the potential 
to destabilize Libya. That Italy did decide to participate in the Libyan intervention—albeit 
after intense lobbying from its EU partners and the United States—is a testament to how 
much it values its relationship with its NATO allies.273  
The 2008 financial crisis and recent austerity measures have caused many to 
question whether Italy’s ambitions are too grandiose for its capabilities. It is difficult to 
justify troop deployments to locations that hold little to no strategic value to the Italian 
homeland when resources are scarce.274 Thus, as of 2015, the Ministry of Defence 
redefined Italy’s sphere of interest as being limited to the Euro-Mediterranean region, 
meaning the EU states, the Balkans, the Maghreb, the Middle East, and the states around 
the Black Sea.275 This reorientation to regions more germane to Italian security can already 
be seen in decisions taken in January 2018—the Italian government is reducing troop levels 
in Iraq and Afghanistan in order to bolster missions in Africa.276  
B. DEPLOYMENT OF ITALIAN TROOPS ABROAD: THE ROLE OF 
DOMESTIC POLITICS 
A delicate balance exists among the Italian government, parliament, and the public. 
The government tends to view participation in international military coalitions as a way to 
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both increase Italy’s reputation and to legitimize its placement in the global hierarchy; it 
views being a member of NATO as an integral part of this legitimization. On the other 
hand, parliament and the public tend to be more focused on domestic issues, more critical 
of NATO membership, and thus often require a more in-depth justification for the use of 
military force. From whence does this hesitancy derive, how is it mollified, and what are 
the consequences?  
As a general observation, Italians view war “as an aberration of inter-state relations. 
An enemy is not regarded as an implacable foe that needs to be confronted with military 
power and, instead, can be more effectively engaged using diplomacy.”277 The tragic costs 
of engaging in two world wars have helped create an aversion to employing unnecessary 
military force. However, one must not think that Italy’s past dooms it to a future of pacifist 
inaction. Italians’ views on defense are a bit more nuanced. For example, a public opinion 
poll taken in 2017 stated that only 30 percent of Italians viewed overseas troop 
deployments favorably, but the very same poll also stated that 69 percent of Italians 
supported the use of military forces against terrorism.278 In that same vein, a scant 13 
percent of Italians want to remain in NATO. However, when presented with the option of 
NATO membership with provisions for more national autonomy, support shifts and 
balloons to 62 percent in favor of continued membership.279  
Additionally, the same poll asked Italian citizens whether they supported an 
increase in the defense budget.  While 60 percent of respondents thought the budget was 
already too high, 40 percent considered it too low.280 Such figures are hardly indicative of 
a state paralyzed by pacifism. If anything, public opinion polls about defense show that the 
issue is polarizing. Nonetheless, when attempting to justify troop deployments abroad, 
many former defense officials agreed that using terms such as “war” or “warfare” would 
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immediately alienate all public support. Thus, the government is forced to construct 
strategic narratives that purposefully obscure and downgrade the true threats to be faced.281  
The use of strategic narratives is especially important in Italy, which is very active 
militarily but has a public that needs to be convinced of the necessity for armed force. 
Italians generally support the use of military forces for things most people would consider 
practical, such as national defense, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and fighting 
terrorism.282 However, they do not support the use of their armed forces for regime change, 
which is why Italy did not participate in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.283 Along with France 
and Germany, Italy viewed the invasion as an attempt at regime change. Yet the desire to 
support the United States was so strong that Italy deployed troops as soon as initial combat 
operations were over. However, in order to gain parliamentary and public support, the 
government employed terms and phrases such as “humanitarian,” “the opposite of war,” 
and “an urgent intervention in favour of the Iraqi people.”284 Unfortunately, the use of these 
terms and phrases led to equipping the mission as if it really were humanitarian in nature. 
The Italian base was located in the middle of town, without any real defensive measures, 
nor did the Italian troops possess any armored vehicles.285 In one instance, after having 
taken incoming fire for over four hours, Rome finally granted permission to return fire.286 
In all, 33 Italians lost their lives in Iraq, many under heroic circumstances that would have 
merited the awarding of medals for valor, but because “humanitarian” missions should not 
require the heroic death of soldiers, no medals were awarded; doing so would have exposed 
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the discrepancies between the strategic narrative and the situation on the ground.287 Public 
support for the Italian mission in Iraq never rose above 47 percent.288   
A similar thing had occurred a few years earlier, during OPERATION Enduring 
Freedom in Afghanistan. In its attempt to craft its strategic narrative, the Italian government 
created a humorous divergence between its analysis of the Afghan operation and that of 
the United States. Italy framed their military contribution to OEF as a “peacekeeping 
operation,” whereas an American spokesman referred to it as a “combat mission” with the 
goal of locating and destroying Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters.289 One example of what can 
happen when a strategic narrative is not based on reality is how Italian air power was used 
in the opening phases of OEF: Italian combat aircraft participated in air strikes, but were 
not allowed to deliver ordnance—they essentially conducted “air strikes” without actually 
using any bombs.290 However, Italy’s involvement in Afghanistan has increased 
considerably in both breadth and capability. It is in charge of Regional Command West 
(RC-West—denoting operational control of the western portion of Afghanistan) and has 
been for the past several years, and has maintained the fourth largest contingent of troops 
to ISAF for more than ten years.291 Indeed, Italian support for the ISAF mission has 
endured through multiple shifts between rightest and leftist governments.292 Italian public 
support remains rather tepid though: as of 2017, 41 percent opposed having troops in 
Afghanistan, 29 percent were ambivalent, and 30 percent supported ongoing efforts.293  
The Italian government improved their strategic narrative for the 2006 mission to 
Lebanon.294 While it was true that the mission was multilateral, endorsed by the UN, and 
involved peacekeeping functions, the government’s narrative also said that the missions 
                                                 
287 Coticchia, 61; Ignazi, 145.  
288  Coticchia, 65. 
289 Ignazi, 132. 
290 Ignazi, 130–131. 
291 Marrone, Strategic Cultures, 195. 
292 Marrone, Strategic Cultures, 195. 
293 Università di Siena, 14. 
294 The 2006 Lebanon War was a conflict between Israel and Hezbollah.  
 67 
would be “long, challenging, expensive, and risky.”295 Interestingly, public support for the 
mission started at only 50 percent, but steadily rose to 60 percent in just two years.296 There 
is something to be said for presenting a more realistic picture to the public.   
Five years later, during the Libyan intervention, the government again used the 
terms “multilateral,” “peace,” and “humanitarian”; but, as the air campaign continued, it 
become apparent that the coalition was working towards regime change, not a humanitarian 
intervention. Once again, the strategic narrative did not coincide with reality and the level 
of public support never rose above 47 percent.297 Not only that, but information about the 
role of Italian armed forces was kept “essentially hidden” from the public.298  
Balancing the competing interests of Italy’s main political parties has also proven 
difficult for successive governments, for the political spectrum ranges from strong left to 
far-right. The main leftist party, the Democratic Party (Partito Democratico), wants to cut 
procurement of the F-35 fighter jet, bring all the troops home, cut military spending and 
personnel numbers, and route all the savings into environmental, economic, and cultural 
areas.299 
The Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle) is a relatively new party that is 
pacifist-left in ideology.300 Like the Democratic Party, they want to cut military spending 
and route it to social services.301 They also espouse the power of diplomacy to solve 
international problems and view overseas troop deployments as fiscally unstainable and 
unethical.302  
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A centrist-liberal party, the Civic Choice (Scelta Civica), wants to decrease military 
spending and scrap the F-35 program, and instead invest in a European defense force.303 
The center-right People of Liberty (Popolo della Libertà) have consistently supported the 
use of the Italian military in operations abroad.304 They oppose defense cuts and support 
the Italian defense industry.305 There were some internal divisions about whether the F-35 
program should be abandoned and funds used for schools and hospitals, but in the end, the 
party’s stance was that military interventions abroad form part-and-parcel of being a 
modern industrial nation.306    
The far-right party, Northern League (Lega Nord), supports the F-35 program but 
not keeping troops in Afghanistan, which they view as too expensive in terms of human 
and monetary costs.307 Lastly, the association of Italian mayors supports decreasing 
defense spending so that domestic programs can be better funded.308   
It is against such a diverse set of interests that the Italian government and military 
must work to secure funding. Since 2008, austerity measures have caused the military 
budget to be cut multiple times; if Italy wanted to devote 2 percent of its GDP to defense, 
then it would need to spend an additional $12 billion.309 Therefore, Italian politicians view 
requests by the government to increase defense spending as out of the question.310  
It is difficult to adequately fund overseas military operations in such an 
unpredictable political climate, especially since the requirements of these types of missions 
may ebb and flow, with surges occurring when more manpower or material is required in 
response to a degraded security environment. To help mitigate problems with financing 
unpredictable military missions, the Italian government set up two reserve funds in order 
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to bypass parliamentary funding obstacles.311 When emergency funding is required for an 
urgent mission, previously saved defense funds can be drawn from one of these two 
accounts. This financial back-up is useful in getting troops out the door and into the crisis 
zone without waiting for parliament to debate on how much funding will be allocated.312 
Once parliament does decide on funding for an overseas operation, the manner in 
which they do so introduces yet another unstable factor. Funding is accomplished by 
passing “law decrees” that do not specify which operation they are designated for.313 Law 
decrees are unreliable because they occur on an as-needed basis and have strings attached 
to them, such as funding for research and development activities that are in no way 
connected to an overseas operation.314 Also, the funding debates are formulaic in nature 
and do not question the need for the deployment in the first place, which raises the issue of 
how involved parliament really is in influencing how the Italian armed forces are used.315  
Article 78 of the Italian Constitution states that only parliament can declare a state 
of war, and that then, and only then, will it vest the necessary powers into the government 
for the prosecution of said war.316 However, every recent overseas troop deployment has 
been conducted as part of a coalition and none has involved “declaring war.”317 Before 
parliament is even consulted, the Supreme Defence Council has already decided on the best 
course of action and on the strategic narrative to be given to parliament and to the people.318 
Often, military forces are deployed before parliament or the Italian people are made aware. 
                                                 
311 The first fund was set-up in 1978 and the other in 2004. Di Camillo, 6–8. 
312 Di Camillo, 6–8. 
313 Law decrees are essentially funding mechanisms in the Italian parliament. Di Camillo, 6–8. 
314 Di Camillo, 6–8. 
315 Di Camillo, 6–8. 
316 Senate Service for Official Reports and Communication, Constitution of the Italian Republic 
(Rome: Parliamentary Information, Archives, and Publications Office, 1947), 
https://www.senato.it/documenti/repository/istituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf. 
317 Di Camillo, 5–6. 
318 The Supreme Defence Council consists of the president’s cabinet, which includes senior military 
officers. See Article 87 of the Italian Constitution.  
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Since 1945, only 52 percent of military deployments were approved by parliament before 
troops departed.319   
C. RESULTS OF THE SHIFT TO AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE 
In the 1990s, a lack of public support for conscription prompted the Italian 
government and military to consider transitioning to an all-volunteer force.320 Starting in 
2000, the military began transitioning from a conscription-based model to one of 
volunteers, completing the process by 2005.321 This change has created new situations and 
challenges for the Italian state and military.  
Because the military now has to attract young people to its ranks, the character of 
its recruiting has taken on a different tone. Websites expound on the benefits of being in 
the armed forces and recruiting advertisements make it sound “cool” and “fun” to be 
serving in the military.322 Even the Army’s website appears slick and up-to-date, with 
functionality to click and quickly see the locations of various overseas missions.323  
Personnel costs have also increased. A year after implementation of the all-
volunteer force, personnel costs constituted 72 percent of the budget.324 By 2010, Italy was 
struggling to recruit enough volunteers—not for a lack of willing young people—but 
because it could not afford the increased costs associated with paying volunteers a higher 
                                                 
319 Di Camillo, 5–6. 
320 Ciro Paoletti, A Military History of Italy (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008), 206.  
321 Labanca, 162. 
322 For example, a recent recruiting advertisement for the Italian navy says “Be Cool and Join the 
Navy!” “Notiziario della Marina: Boom di domande per il concorso in Accademia Navale [News of the 
Navy: A surge of demand for the Naval Academy],” Ministero della Difesa, Marina Militare, February 10, 
2015, http://www.marina.difesa.it/Notiziario-online/Pagine/boomdomandean.aspx. The website for the 
Italian army has a dramatic or interesting picture of a soldier accomplishing a task. “Esercito [Army],” 
Ministero della Difesa, accessed December 12, 2017, http://www.esercito.difesa.it/. In another section, the 
phrase “all you have to do is choose” is used to denote the many options for young people looking to join. 
“Concorsi e Arruolamenti [Courses and Enlistments],” Esercito, accessed December 12, 2017, 
http://www.esercito.difesa.it/concorsi-e-arruolamenti. 
323 It is interesting to compare the website of the Italian Army to that of the Bundeswehr. The Italian 
site looks slick and modern, whereas the German one appears to be from the previous decade (although its 
information is kept up-to-date). Italian Army website: http://www.esercito.difesa.it/. German military 
website: https://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/start. 
324 Ignazi, 178. 
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salary.325 A burdensome factor in the personnel costs is the unusually high ratio of officers 
and senior-enlisted to junior enlisted: for nearly every officer or senior-enlisted person, 
there is slightly more than just one junior enlisted service member.326 This unbalanced ratio 
is a relic from the Cold War military when career service members chose to stay and 
conscripts came and went.327 It was estimated that, in 2010, Italy had an excess of 30,000 
officers and senior-enlisted members.328 The Ministry of Defence is seeking to reduce the 
personnel expenses associated with having so many redundant senior-level members, but 
the government does not want to yet deal with the political and social ramifications of 
laying off so many people.329  
A third consequence is the natural divide that occurs between service members and 
civilians when a state shifts to a professional force. In Italy, active-duty service members 
make up only 0.003 percent of the total population.330 For every Italian military member, 
there are 347 civilians. One can conclude from such a ratio that the rates of interaction 
between the two groups are not high.  
Two other associated factors also exacerbate this disparity. The first is that Italian 
service members are clustered together in military bases around the country, thereby 
limiting military-to-civilian interactions to only those communities near the bases. Thus, 
while only a handful of communities are in a position to interact with active-duty/veteran 
service members, the bulk are not.  
                                                 
325 Valerio Briani, “Italian Armed Forces under Pressure,” Istituto Affari Internazionali 10 (May 2010), 
3, http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iai1009.pdf. 
326 The ratio in 2010 was 1.19. Briani, 3–4.  
327 Briani, 4. 
328 Briani, 5. 
329 Briani, 5; Gilli, 39.  
330 The population of Italy in 2016 was estimated to be 60,656,000. “Indicatori demografici 
[Demographic Indicators],” Istituto Nazionale di Statistica [National Institute of Statistics], February 19, 
2016. https://www.istat.it/it/archivio/180494. The size of the Italian armed forces in 2016 was 174,900. 
This includes the army, navy, and air force. The gendarme-style Carabinieri and Guardia di Finanza are 
not included in this figure because they are predominately paramilitary in nature. Roberta Pinotti, 
Documento Programmatico Pluriennale per la Difesa per il triennio 2014–2016 [Pluralannual 




The second factor is the manpower policy of the Italian military. Unlike the 
American model of the “up or out” promotion system, Italian service members can remain 
in uniform until they reach legal retirement age.331 This manpower policy limits the amount 
of interaction that civilians have with veterans across different demographics. In an “up or 
out” model, a military discharges its members at a relatively regular rate. Those who 
choose to serve an initial term and then separate from the service can often be 
representative of the military for a younger, twenties (years old) demographic. Those who 
choose to serve for around a decade and then separate represent the military to the thirties 
demographic, and those who choose to remain until their forties and then retire from 
military service do the same for their demographic cohort. In every example above, these 
discharged service members most likely returned to a civilian community in order to 
participate in the workforce and, as veterans, placed themselves in a position that permits 
increased contact with their civilian coworkers. This aspect of interaction is lost with a 
manpower policy that allows service members lifetime employment. Once an Italian 
service member retires from the armed forces, their age and the relative financial security 
afforded by a pension do not require them to seek further employment in the civilian sector.  
Thus, Italy’s move to a professional force has come with some positive and 
negative aspects: a professional force is better trained and should generate less controversy 
when it is used abroad, but is also more expensive and widens the gap between service 
members and civilians. Italy will have to learn how to balance these trade-offs in the future.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Ever since its inception as a state, Italy has struggled to rise above what it considers 
its “middle power” status. This desire to legitimize its place in the global hierarchy has 
continued into the 21st century. Successive Italian governments have sought to increase 
                                                 
331 Davide Grasso, “Militari, i requisiti per andare in pensione nel 2016 [Service members, the 
Requirements to Start Retirement in 2016],” Pensionioggi.it, March 7, 2016. 
http://www.pensionioggi.it/notizie/previdenza/militari-ecco-i-requisiti-per-andare-in-pensione-nel-2017-
89789798. The website of the Italian Army helps corroborate the above pension website by stating that a 
service-member can choose indefinite service if he/she so chooses. “Il Percorso guidato per l’Arruolamento 
[The Guided Tour of Enlistment],” Esercito, February 28, 2017. http://www.esercito.difesa.it/concorsi-e-
arruolamenti/percorso. 
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Italy’s standing by being an active contributor of military forces to multinational military 
coalitions. However, because of traumatic experiences during two world wars, Italian 
politicians and the people they represent are more wary of overseas military deployments. 
Unless a proposed deployment has an undergirding of humanitarian or peace-keeping 
objectives, Italian politicians and the public will not give wholehearted support; 
understandably, Italian governments go to great lengths to ensure that proposed overseas 
missions are perceived in this way. Additionally, Italy is making efforts to rebalance its 
armed forces from the masses of the Cold War to a younger and leaner all-volunteer model. 
However, these efforts have widened the civil-military gap: service members are still 
allowed lifetime employment, thus limiting their interactions with civilians, and 
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VI. CONCLUSION: UNDERSTANDING THE CHARACTER AND 
VALUE OF GERMAN AND ITALIAN MILITARY SUPPORT  
Both Germany and Italy possess multiple characteristics that make them attractive 
allies for future multinational military operations. However, each state is experiencing a 
dynamic mix of international and domestic pressures that will nuance how it reacts to 
requests for military assistance. Additionally, the move to an all-volunteer force in both 
states is unchartered territory, and it is not entirely clear at this point what effect it will 
have on decisions to use military force abroad. Lastly, it is important for each state’s allies 
to understand how a German or Italian troop contribution would be equipped and what 
manner of national caveats would restrict its use.  
A. GERMANY  
Germany possesses the world’s fourth highest GDP and could be categorized as an 
economic superpower, making it the most prosperous state within Europe and Eurasia.332 
The fact that the German people were able to rebuild their economy from the ruins of World 
Word II and make democratic Germany a global competitor shows that its people are 
intelligent, hardworking, and willing to cooperate towards a common goal. These attributes 
are all attractive in allies. Germany’s powerful economy gives it diplomatic leverage, as 
well as the means to become a more active security provider if it should so choose.  
Additionally, in light of recent political developments within Britain, Germany may 
assume the mantel of being the European lead state sooner than it would like. Long an 
economic powerhouse, diplomatic leader, and reliable contributor of troops to 
                                                 
332 The World Bank’s rankings for the four highest GDP’s worldwide in 2016 were: the United States, 
China, Japan, and Germany. Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 2016 on German Security Policy 
and the Future of the Bundeswehr, 2016, 111, http://www.gmfus.org/publications/white-paper-german-
security-policy-and-future-bundeswehr. “Gross domestic product 2016,” World Bank, December 15, 2017, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf. 
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multinational military missions, Britain may soon find itself unable to fill these rolls.333 
If—or more likely, when—Britain loses its capacity to lead, others will be looking to 
Germany to fill this role. In order to be the leader of Europe, Germany will have to invest 
more in its armed forces. It certainly has the resources to do so.  
The analysis of the international and domestic pressures and the move to a 
professional military indicates that Germany’s role in providing security will increase, 
albeit slowly; Germany is already experiencing intense international pressure from 
multiple sources to move in this direction. This pressure stems from the election of Donald 
Trump and his renewed calls from NATO member-states to increase their contributions, a 
more assertive Russia, and mass migration flows. Additionally, many of Germany’s own 
leaders support having a more aggressive foreign policy, to include the use of military 
force.  
The contrast between those advocating the use of Bundeswehr forces and those 
against is almost comedic. Von der Leyen touts how important it is for Germany to be a 
reliable ally, and the Bundeswehr routinely deploys its forces in nominal numbers to 
multiple conflict spots abroad, but these comments and deployments are all accomplished 
against the backdrop of a poorly funded military. When information about the military’s 
poor equipment readiness leaks to the media and is broadcast far and wide, Bundestag 
politicians race to point the finger of blame at anyone but themselves.334  
                                                 
333 The consequences of Brexit have the potential to isolate Britain diplomatically and economically 
from the rest of Europe, and its financial woes are contributing to more rounds of defense cuts. It is 
doubtful that Britain’s “special relationship” with the United States will endure if Britain is unable to 
provide the type of resources and leadership that the United States expects. Ewen MacAskill, “Ministry of 
Defence braced for ‘brutal’ cuts in security review,” The Guardian, November 24, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/nov/24/ministry-of-defence-in-line-for-steep-cuts-in-2018. 
334 The Bundeswehr is reported to be short on tanks, operational aircraft and submarines, basic 
equipment such as body armor, night-vision goggles, tents, winter clothing, and spare parts. There are also 
21,000 unfilled officer posts. The various reports are coming out as Germany’s planned participation in the 
NATO Very-High-Readiness-Joint-Task-Force (VJTF) approaches. Politicians are blaming each other for 
the shortfalls. Ben Knight, “German military short on tanks for NATO mission,” Deutsche Welle, February 
15, 2018, http://p.dw.com/p/2sl0y; Timothy Jones, “Germany’s Bundeswehr ‘lacks basic equipment’ for 
NATO mission,” Deutsche Welle, February 19, 2018, http://p.dw.com/p/2suKM; Deutsche Welle, 
“Germany’s lack of military readiness ‘dramatic,’ says Bundeswehr commissioner,” February 20, 2018, 
http://p.dw.com/p/2t0eN; Deutsche Welle, “Limited number of weapons in German military ready for 
action: report,” February 27, 2018, http://p.dw.com/p/2tNlW. 
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Additionally, the extent to which the Bundeswehr is a parliamentary army prohibits 
the government from using it when time is critical—as in the Libyan case. When the 
government does attempt to bypass parliamentary approval of a deployment, it faces 
intense opposition and political consequences. Additionally, not only must parliament 
approve of military missions abroad, but the support of the German people must be gained 
as well, which is difficult to do. The more the government is able to frame a proposed 
military deployment as a humanitarian-style operation, the more success it will have 
gaining public support. However, it should be noted that it may not matter whether 
Germans want to remain pacifist and unengaged; events from without may force them to 
support a more active foreign policy.  
There are a few pros and cons to Germany’s move to a professional military force. 
The first negative aspect of Germany’s conscription-less force is that it creates a wider gulf 
between civilian society and the military. Before, obligatory service ensured that society 
maintained a tenuous link to the military. Regardless of whether a young person went into 
the Bundeswehr or into the National Service, the fact remained that the government was 
demanding a sacrifice of time. Now, with no requirement to serve the state, the idea of 
performing such service as a military member will increasingly be seen as a deviant act, a 
rebellion against proper civilian society. This attitude will only exacerbate the stark divide 
between German civilians and their service members. Additionally, as has been explored 
previously, the Bundeswehr is already struggling to adapt itself to recruiting a military 
consisting entirely of volunteers. In an anti-military society, this adaptation will prove 
difficult. Unlike the United States, or even other European states, Germany cannot use 
patriotism to draw young people to the military; they must rely on incentives and compete 
with the civilian job market. Offering this level of compensation is expensive, and may 
attract young people who are not prepared to risk life-and-limb should the occasion call for 
it.  
However, there are advantages to the Bundeswehr’s professionalization of the 
force. Because society is less concerned about military service, it may show less opposition 
to where the military is sent. This lack of opposition may influence members of the 
Bundestag, who in turn may allow a loosening of parliamentary control over military 
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deployments. One could argue that this lack of connection to service members may enable 
parliament to continue its poor funding of the military, but as the section on international 
pressure implied, German politicians will not be able to continue avoiding the crises 
without their borders, and military deployments abroad will, by necessity, have to increase. 
A professional force, especially one competing with the civilian job market, will be 
required to pay well and offer adequate benefits in order to attract and retain the talent it 
needs to remain effective. A professional military also requires modern equipment that is 
operational. If German politicians want Germany to increase its international relevancy and 
respond to crises abroad, they will be forced to meet these funding requirements. Lastly, a 
professional military is more capable; the people it employs want to be there and are better 
trained in their jobs. Thus, when their state sends them to global hotspots, they will perform 
well and increase Germany’s prestige.  
How will Germany approach requests for military assistance for future conflicts? 
First, expect requests to Germany to be met initially with skepticism. Debates will follow 
in the Bundestag and troops will not be committed until a decision is made. Requests that 
are not dovetailed within a multinational framework provided by the UN, EU, or NATO 
will not be favorably received. Germany’s allies would do well to approach the German 
way of making decisions with patience and understanding; because of its unique history, 
these idiosyncrasies form an integral part of Germany’s national and political culture.  
Second, expect German forces to arrive poorly equipped and with restrictive rules 
of engagement (ROE). Because parliament and the people are more willing to concede to 
military missions abroad that are primarily humanitarian or stabilizing in nature, 
Bundeswehr forces will come equipped for these types of missions. Additionally, 
humanitarian and stability operations require different rules of engagement, so even if the 
mission is kinetic, German ROE will initially be restrictive.335 
                                                 
335 When German forces first deployed to Afghanistan, their rules of engagement were very strict. For 
example, before firing at the enemy, troops were required to say (in Pashto),” United Nations—don’t move 
or I will shoot!” Dale R. Herspring, Civil-Military Relations and Shared Responsibility (Baltimore: The 
John Hopkins University Press, 2013), 128. 
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Third, expect German troops to be relatively well experienced, for the Bundeswehr 
has spent significant time running its own theater of war in Afghanistan.336 Additionally, 
Bundeswehr members will be motivated and committed to the mission. As previously 
noted, young people do not join, and older people remain within, the Bundeswehr because 
it enjoys wide social approval. German military personnel, by nature, must be more 
dedicated and motivated to the organization because if they were not, social opprobrium 
would influence them to leave the military, or not to have joined it in the first place.  
If Germany’s allies realize the unique nature of Germany’s politics and national 
sentiments, they will have a realistic expectation of what Bundeswehr forces can provide. 
Expectations will thus be managed accordingly, and German military forces can be 
assigned to roles commensurate with their ability and which fit within their political 
restraints. 
B. ITALY 
Italy’s geographic location makes it ideally suited as a basing area from which to 
embark on missions to volatile regions in the Balkans, the Maghreb, the Middle East, and 
the Black Sea area.337 Since Italy has been involved in many of these regions in the past—
whether through colonization, military action, or political meddling—it possesses a level 
of expertise that other states cannot match. For example, Italy’s knowledge of Somalia and 
                                                 
336 From 2002 to 2014, Germany was in control of Regional-Command North during the ISAF mission 
in Afghanistan. Despite ISAF having transitioned full control to Afghan forces in 2014, hundreds of 
German troops remain to assist and advise the Afghan security forces. “ISAF’s mission in Afghanistan 
(2001–2014) (Archived),” NATO, September 1, 2015, 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69366.htm. 
337 Vincenzo Camporini, Jean-Pierre Darnis, Alessandro Marrone, Stefano Silvestri, and Alessandro R. 
Ungaro, “The White Paper: A Strategy for Italy’s Defence Policy,” edited by Alessandro Marrone, Istituto 
Affari Internazionali 15 (June 2015), http://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/white-paper-strategy-italys-
defence-policy. 
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the eccentricities of its political culture helped it to avoid an incident similar to the one 
experienced by the United States in 1993.338  
Moreover, Italy has the experience and equipment necessary for meaningful 
contributions to international military missions. A recent report by Credit Suisse stated that 
Italy was a stronger military power than the United Kingdom, and that it possessed more 
military capability than Germany.339 Specifically, Italy “is one of Europe’s biggest 
contributors [of troops] to international military operations.”340 In 2016, Italy deployed 
nearly double the number of troops provided by Germany.341 Because of its contributions, 
Italian military personnel have developed expertise in many areas. One example is 
submarining, a skill for which Germany is cited as lacking.342 The Italian navy has been 
active for the past several years in dealing with migrant flows in the Mediterranean, and 
has thus gained experience its allies have not. Moreover, Italy not only deployed to 
Afghanistan, but also to Iraq, which France and Germany did not do.  
Third, and perhaps most important, Italy has an engrained desire within its political 
culture to support international military operations. Successive Italian governments have 
continued to display a broad political consensus towards contributing to international 
security.343 Italy’s desire to contribute troops is strengthened when military operations 
function within a multinational framework such as those associated with the UN, EU, or 
                                                 
338 Italian armed forces were more attune to Somalian political culture since they had spent significant 
time attempting to colonize Somalia in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The Italians thus refused to 
participate in UN efforts to capture a local Somali warlord in the mid-1990s. The United States, on the 
other hand, participated wholeheartedly and later suffered a humiliating defeat (as vividly portrayed in the 
movie Black Hawk Down). Michael F. Beech, “Mission Creep: A Case Study of U.S. Involvement in 
Somalia,” (monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1996), 4–5, 32; Paoletti, 
209-210.  
339 Daniel Keohane, “The Defense Policies of Italy and Poland: A Comparison,” Center for Security 
Studies ETH Zurich No. 219 (December 2017), http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-
interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse219-EN.pdf. 
340 Keohane, 2. 
341 Keohane estimates that in 2016, Italy contributed 6,000 troops to international military missions, 
whereas Germany contributed 3,016. Keohane, 2. 
342 Keohane, 1. 
343 Piero Ignazi, Giampiero Giacomello, Fabrizio Coticchia, Italian Military Operations Abroad: Just 
Don’t Call It War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 162–163. 
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NATO. In fact, multiple former defense officials and politicians believe that the strategic 
goals of these organizations should help prioritize Italy’s foreign policy agenda.344 
The analysis of international pressure, domestic pressure, and the move away from 
conscription implies that Italy will continue to be a willing contributor to international 
military missions. Regarding international pressure, Italy has already demonstrated a deep 
desire to be a “team player” in an attempt to move beyond what others (and itself) see as a 
“middle power” category. It has demonstrated this desire by consistently being a participant 
in international military missions since the founding of the Republic in 1948. Also, Italy 
considers itself a staunch ally of the United States, as evidenced by its troop contributions 
to Iraq and Afghanistan, and its participation—against its economic best interests—in the 
Libyan campaign. These contributions were given despite the homeland not being in 
danger or having been already attacked. It stands to reason that Italy’s support of its allies 
for international military missions that involve the UN, EU, or NATO will continue into 
the foreseeable future.  
Domestic pressure nests nicely within Italy’s international ambitions, for the 
pursuit of these ambitions would not be possible if domestic politics did not support it. 
Italians have a more favorable view of military forces and their employment than do 
Germans, and Italians are not as much in conflict with their past. Additionally, it has been 
noted that the Italian political elite are globalist in outlook and consider participation in 
international military coalitions as fundamental to maintaining Italy’s reputation. Lastly, 
Italian governments seem to enjoy more soft power than do their German counterparts, in 
that Italian parliaments seem much less recalcitrant to approve military deployments and 
more indulgent when the government requests permission after having already sent forces 
abroad.  
The reasoning for conscription follows somewhat the same stated for Germany. 
When a society ceases to be bound by military conscription, what was formally a 
comprehensive burden shared by many becomes a narrow burden shared by few. By 
delinking the responsibilities of adult citizenship with military service, the average Italian 
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citizen thinks less about what his or her military is doing because he or she is not required 
to participate if they chose not to. Thus, the military and its activities take a backseat in the 
cultural life of a society, and voters are less likely to question what their military is doing. 
Additionally, shedding conscripts who will spend mere months in service helps the military 
to focus on the smaller group of dedicated personnel it does have. The military is thus better 
trained and more motivated. These aspects can prove advantageous to governments—
including Italy’s—looking to improve their international standing. A professional military 
is more capable and better able to accomplish complicated missions and thus enhance its 
state’s image abroad. A professional military also has a vested self-interest is being useful 
to the government. A military that is perceived as being able to accomplish the tasks 
assigned by its government will enjoy better funding, more support, and less interference 
in its policies, things which will help to guarantee its perpetuity in the long run.  
When and to what extent can Italy’s allies expect it to contribute to multinational 
military missions in the future? First, Italy is not a superpower, economic or otherwise. 
Thus, while its contributions will include highly trained and capable personnel, they will 
not be backed-up by the most technologically up-to-date equipment, or possibly not enough 
equipment or munitions.  
Second, because it cannot afford to support globe-spanning, lengthy troop 
deployments, expect Italy to be most amenable to supporting deployments in its 
backyard—namely the Mediterranean, the Balkans, the Black Sea area, and the Middle 
East. For missions outside these areas, expect equivocations and perhaps half-hearted 
commitments from Italian leaders.  
Additionally, it is politically necessary for Italy’s leaders that deployment requests 
be lodged within the framework of a multinational organization such as NATO, the EU, or 
the UN. Also, there should be an expectation that Italy’s military forces come with national 
caveats. These caveats are reflective of the distortion of reality that the government has to 
make to parliament and to Italian citizens in order to gain their approval for troop 
deployments abroad. Support for operations of a clearly combat nature will be gained by 
the use of terms such as “humanitarian” and “stability,” and Italian troop contingents will 
come appropriately equipped for such missions as advertised by the government. 
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Additionally, if kinetic action is required, Italian forces may be expected to request 
permission from higher authorities before engaging with lethal force; this centralization of 
decision authority is a result of operations being mislabeled at the strategic level and will 
take time to sort themselves out. However, if these limiting factors are accounted for early 
on by Italy’s allies, then expectations will not exceed reality and Italian troop contributions 




























LIST OF REFERENCES 
Abenheim, Donald. Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West 
German Armed Forces. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.  
Abenheim, Donald, and Carolyn Halladay. “Stability in Flux: Policy, Strategy, and 
Institutions in Germany.” In The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, 
edited by Thomas C. Bruneau, Cristiana Matei, 304–317, New York: Routledge, 
2013, https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780203105276.ch25.  
Alessi, Christopher. “Learning to Fight: How Afghanistan Changed the German 
Military.” SPIEGEL ONLINE. October 15, 2013. 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/how-afghanistan-has-changed-the-
bundeswehr-german-military-a-927891.html.  
Arca, Gianluigi. “BERSAGLIERI INFANTRY: Heroes in Italian History.” NATO Rapid 
Deployable Corps Italy Magazine. Issue 13, 2009. https://www.nato.int/nrdc-
it/magazine/2009/0911/0911i.pdf.  
Bacevich, Andrew J. Breach of Trust: How Americans Failed Their Soldiers and Their 
Country. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2013.  
Barracco, Giuseppe. “165 Bersaglieri.” YouTube, 0:48. November 4, 2010. 
https://youtube.com/watch?v=tNHOLMRoMK4.  
Beardsley, Steven. “Military history provides traditional dilemma for German army.” 
Deutsche Welle. October 13, 2017. http://p.dw.com/p/2lm5i.  
Beech, Michael F. “Mission Creep: A Case Study of U.S. Involvement in Somalia.” 
Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1996.  
Beller, Annelie, and Rabea Hass. “New Challenges for the Cooperation between Civil 
Society and the Public Sector: The National Voluntary Service in Germany.” In 
Manufacturing Civil Society: Principles, Practices and Effects, edited by Taco 
Brandsen, Willem Trommel, and Bram Verschuere, 116–135. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.  
Bertrand, Charles L. “Politics of the Italian Army: 1861–1918.” Review in The American 
Historical Review, Vol. 83, No. 1 (February 1978): 206. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1866012.  
Borger, Julian. “Germany slowly comes to terms with sending its armed forces abroad.” 
The Guardian. September 18, 2012. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/18/germany-military-modernise-
foreign-intervention.  
Briani, Valerio. “Italian Armed Forces under Pressure.” Istituto Affari Internazionali 10 
(May 2010). http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iai1009.pdf.  
 86 
Brigham Young University. “The Treaty of London (1915).” June 30, 2009. 
https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php?title=The_Treaty_of_London_(1915)&oldid=8
342.  
Brockmeier, Sarah. “Germany and the Intervention in Libya.” Survival: Global Politics 
and Strategy 55:6 (December 2013): 63–90. https://doi: 
10.1080/00396338.2013.862937.  
Bundesministerium der Verteidigung [Federal Ministry of Defense]. “Einsatzzahlen – die 
Stärke der deutschen Kontingente [Use figures – the strength of the German 
contingent].” January 12, 2018. 
https://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/start/einsaetze/ueberblick/zahlen/.  
Bundeswehr. “Der ISAF-Einsatz und der “Wald der Erinnerung” [The ISAF mission and 








Bundeswehr. “Die Rekruten [The Recruits].” YouTube trailer, 0:57. October 22, 2016. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PTaTJezeuDo&index=1&list=PL0nyHde37tI
ao-vYD1K4rvhW4Hoav-ITq.  
Caforio, Giuseppe. “The Political Influence of the Military in Italy: 1945–1993, Lessons 
Learned.” Mednarodne Konference Civilno-Vojaska Razmerja v Demokraciji 
Ljubljana-Bled [International Conference on Civil-military Relations in 
Democracies Ljubljana-Bled] (10-11 March 1994). 
https://www.dlib.si/stream/URN:NBN:SI:DOC-SQPXNSFD/4eb49279-879c-
43dd-9594-0059fb425873/PDF.  
Camporini, Vincenzo, Jean-Pierre Darnis, Alessandro Marrone, Stefano Silvestri, and 
Alessandro R. Ungaro. “The White Paper: A Strategy for Italy’s Defence Policy.” 
Edited by Alessandro Marrone. Istituto Affari Internazionali 15 (June 2015). 
http://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/white-paper-strategy-italys-defence-policy.  
Center for Holocaust Studies and Genocide at West Point, United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum. “Ordinary Soldiers: A Study in Ethics, Law, and Leadership.” 
Accessed October 11, 2017. https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/20140830-ordinary-
soldiers-case-study.pdf.  
Coticchia, Fabrizio. “Effective strategic narratives? Italian public opinion and military 
operations in Iraq, Libya, and Lebanon.” Italian Political Science Review/Rivista 
Italiana di Scienza Politica, 45, 1 (April 2015): 53–78. https://doi: 
10.1017/ipo.2015.1.  
Craig, Gordon A. The Politics of the Prussian Army: 1640–1945. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1964.  
 87 
Daugherty III, Leo J. “Tip of the Spear: The Formation and Expansion of the 
Bundeswehr, 1949–1963.” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 24:1, 147–177, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2010.549052.   
Deutsche Welle. “Germany’s defense minister visits troops in Jordan.” January 18, 2018. 
http://p.dw.com/p/2qnac.  
Deutsche Welle. “Germany gets its first monument for fallen soldiers since WWII.” 
September 8, 2009. http://p.dw.com/p/JVqh.  
Deutsche Welle. “Germany’s lack of military readiness ‘dramatic,’ says Bundeswehr 
commissioner.” February 20, 2018. http://p.dw.com/p/2t0eN.  
Deutsche Welle. “German military flew nearly 700 missions against Islamic State in 
2016.” December 29, 2016. http://p.dw.com/p/2UylA.  
Deutsche Welle. “German military: 200 soldiers classified as far-right extremists since 
2008.” October 23, 2017. http://p.dw.com/p/2mKSg.  
Deutsche Welle. “Report: Top German officials on terror suspects hit list.” May 9, 2017. 
http://p.dw.com/p/2cez1.  
Deutsche Welle. “Limited number of weapons in German military ready for action: 
report.” February 27, 2018. http://p.dw.com/p/2tNlW.  
Di Camillo, Federica, and Paola Tessari. “Italian Missions Abroad: National Interests and 
Procedural Practice.” Istituto Affari Internazionali 13 (February 2013). 
http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaiwp1307.pdf.  
Diamond, Jeremy. “Trump scolds NATO allies over defense spending.” CNN. May 25, 
2017. https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/25/politics/trump-nato-financial-
payments/index.html.  
Dupuy, T. N. A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807–1945. 
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977.  
Echevarria II, Antulio J. After Clausewitz. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000. 
Encyclopedia Britannica. “World War I and fascism, war and its aftermath, conduct of 
the war.” Accessed April 9, 2018. https://www.britannica.com/place/Italy/World-
War-I-and-fascism.  
Esercito. “Concorsi e Arruolamenti [Courses and Enlistments].” Accessed December 12, 
2017. http://www.esercito.difesa.it/concorsi-e-arruolamenti.  
Esercito. “Il Percorso guidato per l’Arruolamento [The Guided Tour of Enlistment].” 
February 28, 2017. http://www.esercito.difesa.it/concorsi-e-
arruolamenti/percorso.  
The Federal Constitutional Court. “Judgment of the Second Senate of 7 May 2008 on the 





Federal Minister of Defence. White Paper 1973/1974, The Security of the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the Development of the Federal Armed Forces. Bonn: 
Press and Information Office of the Government of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, 1974 
Federal Ministry of Defence. White Paper 2016 on German Security Policy and the 
Future of the Bundeswehr, 2016. http://www.gmfus.org/publications/white-paper-
german-security-policy-and-future-bundeswehr.  
Fogarty, Francesca. “Backing the Bundeswehr: A Research Note Regarding the State of 
German Civil-Military Affairs.” Armed Forces and Society 2015 41(4) (2014): 
742–755. DOI: 10.1177/0095327X14554278.  
Gathmann, Florian, and Veit Medick. “Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan: Did the German 
Government Misinform the Country?” SPIEGEL ONLINE. November 26, 2009. 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/civilian-deaths-in-afghanistan-did-
the-german-government-misinform-the-country-a-663696.html.  
Geffen, Williams. “The Role of the Military in West German Defense Policy Making.” 
PhD diss., University of Denver, 1971. 
Gilli, Andrea, Alessandro R. Ungaro, and Alessandro Marrone. “The Italian White Paper 
for International Security and Defence.” The RUSI Journal 160:6 (December 
2015): 34–41. DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2015.1122978.  
Grasso, Davide. “Militari, i requisiti per andare in pensione nel 2016 [Service members, 
the Requirements to Start Retirement in 2016].” Pensionioggi.it, March 7, 2016. 
https://www.forzearmate.org/pensioni-militari-ecco-i-requisiti-per-andare-in-
pensione-nel-2016/.  
Herspring, Dale R. Civil-Military Relations and Shared Responsibility. Baltimore, The 
John Hopkins University Press, 2013.  
Il Post. “Dove saranno i militari italiani nel 2018 [Where will Italian troops be in 
2018?].” January 17, 2018. http://www.ilpost.it/2018/01/17/missioni-militari-
italiane-2018/.  
Il Post. “La Germania ha provato a risolvere i suoi problem con l’esercito con un reality 
show [Germany tried to resolve its problems with the army by producing a reality 
show].” December 30, 2017. https://www.ilpost.it/2017/12/30/reality-show-
esercito-tedesco-die-rekruten/.  
Ignazi, Piero, Giampiero Giacomello, and Fabrizio Coticchia. Italian Military Operations 
Abroad: Just Don’t Call It War. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.  
Istituto Nazionale di Statistica. “Indicatori demografici [Demographic Indicators].” 
Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, February 19, 2016. 
https://www.istat.it/it/archivio/180494.  
Jones, Timothy. “Germany’s Bundeswehr ‘lacks basic equipment’ for NATO mission.” 
Deutsche Welle. February 19, 2018. http://p.dw.com/p/2suKM.  
 89 
Junk, Julian, and Christopher Daase. “Germany.” In Strategic Cultures in Europe: 
Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent, edited by Heiko Biehl, 
Bastian Giegerich and Alexandra Jones, 193–206. Wiesbaden: Spring 
Fachmedien, 2013.  
Kennedy, Brian. “Most Americans trust the military and scientists to act in the public’s 
interest.” Pew Research. October 18, 2016. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2016/10/18/most-americans-trust-the-military-and-scientists-to-act-in-the-
publics-interest/.  
Keohane, Daniel. “The Defense Policies of Italy and Poland: A Comparison.” Center for 
Security Studies ETH Zurich No. 219 (December 2017).  
Kern, Vera. “What draws right-wing extremists to the military?” Deutsche Welle. May 
11, 2017. http://p.dw.com/p/2cpOt.  
Knight, Ben. “German army under scrutiny for recruiting teenagers.” Deutsche Welle. 
November 22, 2017. http://p.dw.com/p/2T3OE.  
Knight, Ben. “Germany extends military missions, expecting long coalition talks.” 
Deutsche Welle. September 28, 2017. http://p.dw.com/p/2kup4.  
Knight, Ben. “Germany promises army reforms after neo-Nazi terror plot.” Deutsche 
Welle. May 10, 2017. http://p.dw.com/p/2ckxU.  
Knight, Ben. “German military short on tanks for NATO mission.” Deutsche Welle. 
February 15, 2018. http://p.dw.com/p/2sl0y.  
Koenig, Nicole, Marie Walter-Franke. “France and Germany: Spearheading a European 




Kulish, Nicholas. “No Parade for Hans.” New York Times. November 14, 2009. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/15/weekinreview/15kulish.html.  
Kümmel, Gerhard. “Civil-Military Relations in Germany: Past, Present and Future.” 
Working Paper, Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr [Social Scienc 
Institute of the Bundeswehr], 2001. http://www.mgfa-
potsdam.de/html/einsatzunterstuetzung/downloads/ap131englisch.pdf. 
Kümmel, Gerhard. “The winds of change: the transition from armed forces for peace to 
new missions for the Bundeswehr and its impact on civil-military relations.” 
Journal of Strategic Studies 26:2 (June 2010): 7–28. DOI: 
10.1080/01402390412331302955.  
Labanca, Nicola. “Defence Policy in the Italian Republic: Frames and Issues.” Unidad de 
Investigacion sobre Seguridad y Cooperacion [The Research Unit on 
International Security and Cooperation] Internacional Discussion Papers, no. 25 
(January 2011): 145–165.   
 90 
Lindsay, Timothy B. “Security Implications of Italian Nationalism.” Master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/48550. 
The local.de. “Hundreds more German troops arrive in Lithuania amid Russia fears.” 
February 7, 2017. https://www.thelocal.de/20170207/hundreds-more-german-
troops-arrive-in-lithuania-amid-russia-fears.  
Lombardi, Ben. “The Berlusconi Government and Intervention in Libya.” The 
International Spectator 46:4 (January 2012): 31–44. DOI: 
http://dx.DOI.org/10.1080/03932729.2011.628090.  
MacAskill, Ewen. “Ministry of Defence braced for ‘brutal’ cuts in security review.” The 
Guardian. November 24, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2017/nov/24/ministry-of-defence-in-line-for-steep-cuts-in-2018.  
MacGregor-Hastie, Roy. The Day of the Lion: The Life and Death of Fascist Italy, 1922–
1945. New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1963.  
Mader, Matthias. “Citizens Perceptions of Policy Objectives and Support for Military 
Action: Looking for Prudence in Germany.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 
volume 61(6) (2015): 1290–1314. DOI: 10.1177/0022002715603099.  
Macksey, Kenneth. From Triumph to Disaster: The Fatal Flaws of German Generalship 
from Moltke to Guderian. Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 1996. 
Marrone, Alessandro, and Paola Tessari. “Il dibattito italiano sulle questioni di difesa: 
questa sera si recita a soggetto? [The Italian Debate about the Issues of Defense, 
Tonight We Improvise?]” Istituto Affari Internazionali 13 (September 2013). 
http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iai1305.pdf.  
Marrone, Alessandro, and Federica Di Camillo. “Italy.” In Strategic Cultures in Europe: 
Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent, edited by Heiko Biehl, 
Bastian Giegerich and Alexandra Jones, 193 – 206. Wiesbaden: Spring 
Fachmedien, 2013.  
Martin, Nils. “Germany in Afghanistan: The German Domestic Dispute on Military 
Deployment Overseas.” Master’s Thesis, James Madison University, 2016. 
http://commons.lib.jmu.edu/master201019/118.  
Ministero della Difesa. “Esercito [Army].” Accessed December 12, 2017. 
http://www.esercito.difesa.it/.  
Ministero della Difesa, Marine Militare. “Notiziario della Marina: Boom di domande per 
il concorso in Accademia Navale [News of the Navy: A surge of demand for the 
Naval Academy].” February 10, 2015. http://www.marina.difesa.it/Notiziario-
online/Pagine/boomdomandean.aspx.  
Ministero della Difesa. “Operazione ‘Strade Sicure’[Operation ‘Secure Streets.’]” Site 




Ministero della Difesa. “Operazioni [Operations].” Site accessed December 8, 2017. 
http:www.esercito.difesa.it/operazioni/Pagine/default.aspx.  
NATO. “ISAF’s mission in Afghanistan (2001–2014) (Archived).” September 1, 2015. 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69366.htm.  
Navarria, Giovanni. “Looking back at 1992: Italy’s horrible year.” The Conversation, 
October 8, 2016. https://theconversation.com/looking-back-at-1992-italys-
horrible-year-66739.  
Paoletti, Ciro. A Military History of Italy. Westport: Praeger, 2007.  
Pearson, Alexander. “Germans trust police more than bankers, new survey finds.” 
Deutsche Welle. January 2, 2018. http://p.dw.com/p/2qFZv.  
Pietras, Jennifer. “Military conscription to end in Germany.” The European Institute. 
September 2010. https://www.europeaninstitute.org/index.php/ei-blog/107-
september-2010/1153-military-conscription-to-end-in-germany.  
Pinotti, Roberta. Documento Programmatico Pluriennale per la Difesa per il triennio 
2014–2016 [Pluralannual Programming Document for Defense for 2014–2016]. 
Rome: Ministero della Difesa, 2017.  
https://www.difesa.it/Content/Documents/nota_aggiuntiva/01_DPP_2014_2016.p
df.  
Prospero. “The cultural resonance of Italy’s Alpini.” The Economist. January 11, 2017. 
https://www.economist.com/blogs/prospero/2017/01/mountain-men.  
Savings.org. “Inflation Calculator.” Accessed February 23, 2018. 
https://www.saving.org/inflation/.  
School History.org.UK. “The impact of the First World War on Germany.” Accessed 
February 23, 2018. http://schoolshistory.org.uk/topics/european-history/weimar-
germany/impact-first-world-war-germany/.  
Searle, Alaric. Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on 
Rearmament, 1949–1959. Westport: Praeger, 2003. 
Senate Service for Official Reports and Communication. Constitution of the Italian 
Republic. Rome: Parliamentary Information, Archives, and Publications Office, 
1947. 
https://www.senato.it/documenti/repository/istituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf.  
Serino, Pietro. “The Italian Army’s Role in Homeland Security.” Carlisle Barracks: Army 
War College, 2003.  
Sheehan, James J. Where Have All the Soldiers Gone? The Transformation of Modern 
Europe. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2008.  




Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr [Social Science Institute of the 
Bundeswehr]. Wahrnehmung und Bewertung des Claims “Wir. Dienen. 
Deutschland.,” Image der Bundeswehr sowie Haltungen zum Umgang mit 
Veteranen Ergebnisse der Bevölkerungsumfrage [Perception and evaluation of the 
claim “We. Serve. Germany.”: Image of the Bundeswehr as well as attitudes to 





SPIEGEL Staff. “Germany’s Disarmed Forces: Ramshackle Military at Odds with Global 
Aspirations.” SPIEGEL ONLINE, September 30, 2014. 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/ramshackle-army-at-odds-with-
berlin-s-global-aspirations-a-994607.html.  
Trading Economics. “Germany Military Expenditure: 1990–2016.” Accessed April 5, 
2018. https://tradingeconomics.com/germany/military-expenditure.  
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. “Background: The Aftermath of World War 
I.” Accessed February 23, 2018. https://www.ushmm.org/learn/holocaust-
encyclopedia/background-aftermath-world-war-i.  
Università di Siena, and Istituto Affari Internazionali. Gli italiani e la politica esterna 
[The Italians and foreign policy]. Siena: October 2017. 
http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files//laps-iai_2017.pdf.  
VisitBerlin.de. “Bundeswehr Cenotaph: Memorial to fallen servicemen and women.” 
Accessed January 26, 2018. https://www.visitberlin.de/en/bundeswehr-cenotaph.  
Whalen, Robert Weldon. “War Losses—Germany.” 1914–1918 Online: International 
Encyclopedia of the First World War. October 8, 2014. https://encyclopedia.1914-
1918-online.net/article/war_losses_germany.  
The War Office. Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great 
War: 1914–1920. London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1922. 
https://archive.org/details/statisticsofmili00grea.  
Welt. “Farbattacke auf Bundeswehr-Showroom in Berlin [Paint attack against a 
Bundeswehr recruiting office in Berlin].” November 9, 2015. 
https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article148630030/Farbattacke-auf-
Bundeswehr-Showroom-in-Berlin.html.  
Werkhäuser, Nina. “German coalition hopefuls discuss defense, security.” Deutsche 
Welle. November 2, 2017. http://p.dw.com/p/2msCW.  
Werkhäuser, Nina. “Opinion: The Germans and Their Army.” Deutsche Welle. 
November 11, 2005. http://p.dw.com/p/7R9H.  
Whittam, John. Politics of the Italian Army: 1861–1918. London: Croom Helm Ltd, 
1977.  
 93 
World Bank. “Data: Germany.” Accessed April 5, 2018. 
https://data.worldbank.org/country/Germany.  
World Bank. “Gross domestic product 2016.” December 15, 2017. 
https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf.  
Zilian, Frederick Jr. From Confrontation to Cooperation: The Takeover of the National 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
  
 95 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
